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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Penny Mackey ("Mackey") appeals from a judgment
setting aside a quitclaim deed executed by her grandmother Louise
Baugh ("Baugh") giving Mackey a one-half interest in two
properties located in Clearfield, Utah.

Appellant argues that

the deed was a present conveyance of a property interest that was
not testamentary in character, and therefore the quitclaim deed
should not have been set aside by the trial court.

Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
UTAH CODE UNANN.

§ 78-2A-3(k) (1993).

Standard of Review
Factual findings of the trial court are set aside only if
they are clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d
95, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(affirming invalidity of deeds).
However findings of fact relating to intent "must show that the
court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is
supported by the evidence.'"

Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804

P.2d 540, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(trial court's findings
insufficient to support judgment regarding testator's
intent)(citations omitted).

Moreover, "one who asserts the

invalidity of a deed must so prove by clear and convincing
evidence."

Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807,

809 (Utah 1966) (affirming validity of deed); See also. Baker v.
1

Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984) (affirming validity of
deed).

This Court gives no deference to the trial court's

conclusions of law.

Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville

Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err when it ruled that a quitclaim

deed, duly executed and recorded, did not presently convey the
grantor's entire interest in the properties to the grantee?
2.

Alternatively, did the trial court err when it failed to

consider the possibility that a quitclaim deed, duly executed and
recorded, presently conveyed a vested remainder interest to the
grantee, despite retention of a life estate for the grantor?

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION
There is a relevant statutory provision on this appeal.
UTAH CODE UNANN.

§ 57-1-3

(1993)

states:

A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass
by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from
the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Appellees, Ernest Gleed ("Gleed") and Baugh, through her
substituted party plaintiff and personal representative Verlin
Gleed, sued the Appellant Mackey to set aside a quitclaim deed
dated March 23, 1992. The deed was executed by Baugh several
2

months before her death.

Its effect would have been to sever a

joint tenancy Baugh created by deed to Gleed in 1990 in two
adjacent homes in Clearfield, Utah, making Mackey and Gleed
tenants in common.

Gleed—who is one of Baugh's sons—asserted

that Mackey—who is Baugh's granddaughter by a daughter—
exercised undue influence over Baugh, and that Baugh was not
competent when she executed the quitclaim deed.
Course of the Proceedings Below
This action was tried before the trial court without a jury
on August 19 and 20, 1993. A number of doctors and persons
familiar with Baugh testified as to her competence to execute the
deed, whether Mackey exercised undue influence over Baugh, and
what Baugh's intentions were when executing the deed.

The trial

court announced its ruling from the bench before the parties and
counsel on August 25, 1993. Both the Appellant and Appellee
submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and
judgement on two occasions following the ruling, and additionally
the parties' counsel made arguments at a telephone conference
hearing the trial court convened on January 14, 1994. Based on
the trial record, the arguments and objections made by the
respective counsel at the January 14, 1994 hearing, and from the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the court, the
trial court issued its judgment on January 25, 1994.
Disposition Below
The trial court ruled that the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed
3

from Baugh to Mackey was invalid and should be set aside. While
the trial court found that Baugh was competent when she executed
the quitclaim deed and not under undue influence from Mackey, the
court found that Baugh did not intend to transfer a present
ownership interest in the properties, but rather intended the
quitclaim deed to have testamentary effect. Additionally, the
trial court ruled that the 1990 warranty deed making Gleed and
Baugh joint tenants in the properties was valid and binding as to
the home Gleed occupied, but was invalid as to the home Baugh
lived in because there had been no intent by Baugh to convey a
present ownership interest in her house.

Gleed cross-appeals to

this court for relief regarding that aspect of the trial court's
decision.
Statement of the Facts
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Baugh and her husband
acquired two adjacent lots with houses (the "properties") in
Clearfield, Utah as joint tenants. The Baughs lived continuously
in one of these houses and rented out the other property.
Baugh's husband died in 1990. Shortly thereafter the
Appellee Gleed moved back to Utah from Nevada.

Gleed occupied

the rental property while Baugh continued to occupy her house.
On February 14, 1990, Baugh executed and recorded a warranty deed
conveying in joint tenancy to herself and Gleed the two
properties.
Mackey lived for extended periods of time with her
grandparents, the Baughs, during her childhood and early
4

adulthood until 1982. She was the Baughs favorite granddaughter.
Mackey continued to live nearby in Utah until 1985, when at age
twenty-six she moved out-of-state due to her husband's career
opportunities.

Mackey returned to Utah in November 1990 to be

near her grandmother, Baugh.

Following her return, Mackey

continued her close relationship with her grandmother.

Their

closeness was indicated by the fact Mackey bathed Baugh (who
suffered from chronic lung disease) once or twice a week, visited
Baugh as often as possible (often on a daily basis), and provided
Baugh with affection and companionship.
Baugh died intestate on July 29, 1992 at seventy-eight years
of age.

Prior to her death, on March 23, 1992, Baugh conveyed

her interest in the two properties to Mackey by quitclaim deed.
The events leading up to this conveyance were as follows.
Beginning in early 1991, Baugh began telling Mackey that
Baugh wanted Mackey to have the house that Baugh lived in (Trial
Transcript Volume I at 120, 163). Baugh had asked Gleed to take
his name off the warranty deed to her house and put Mackey's name
on it, but he had refused (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 121124).

Baugh began asking Mackey if she'd had the deed taken care

of and Mackey would tell her that there was nothing she could do
(Trial Transcript Volume I at 165). Baugh said she had already
given Gleed enough of her assets (Trial Transcript Volume I at
166).

On March 12, 1992, Baugh told Mackey that she would just

sign over her interest in both homes to Mackey and Gleed would
have to work out something with her to get his home (Trial
5

Transcript Volume 1 at 166-68).

Mackey then called Associated

Title to make arrangements for the deed and an appointment for
her grandmother (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 166-68).
On March 23, 1992, Mackey accompanied Baugh to Associated
Title where an associate of the company, Lori Brown, prepared the
deed.

Ms. Brown testified that Baugh understood the questions

which were asked of her and appropriately answered those
questions. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9). Baugh
also appeared to Ms. Brown to be competent and to understand the
nature of the proceeding where Baugh signed the quitclaim deed to
Mackey (Id.).

The quitclaim deed was recorded on March 24, 1992

in the Office of the Davis County Recorder (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 5 ) .
Following the March 23, 1992 conveyance, Gleed launched a
campaign to get Baugh to ask for a return of the deed and for
Mackey to return the properties to him and Baugh (Trial
Transcripts Volume I at 173-76).

When that was unsuccessful,

Gleed initiated this lawsuit.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

Utah statutory and case law presumes that a duly

executed and recorded deed presently conveys the full property
interest that a grantor has.

Persons attacking the validity of

such a deed must do so by clear and convincing evidence.

That

Baugh presently conveyed her full interest in the properties to
Mackey is evidenced in this case by the fact that: A) the
6

quitclaim deed was duly executed and recorded; B) the only
neutral party present at the execution of the quitclaim deed—
Lori Brown—stated Baugh understood the transaction and that she
was conveying her property; C) there was no contradictory
evidence indicating Baugh did not intend a present conveyance;
and D) the trial court failed to take into account its finding
that Baugh intended to give Mackey negotiating leverage over
Gleed# which could not be done unless some property interest was
presently conveyed.

Additionally, the trial court failed to show

in a logical manner that its findings of fact were clearly
supported by the evidence; and the trial court misapplied the
case law that it cited in support of its finding that no present
property interest was conveyed.

Therefore, Gleed failed to

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Baugh did not
intend a present conveyance to Mackey.
2.

Even if Baugh desired to retain possession of her home

during her lifetime, that desire is not inconsistent with the
grant of a present, vested remainder interest.

Case law supports

the Appellant's contention that a grantor can retain possession
of a gift during her lifetime, yet the gift is still valid and
binding and not testamentary in character.

Therefore, even if

Baugh did desire to retain possession of her house during her
lifetime, she nevertheless gave Mackey a present and vested
property interest when she executed and recorded the quitclaim
deed.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BAUGH
INTENDED TO RETAIN ALL OWNERSHIP INTEREST
POSSESSED BY HER IN THE BAUGH HOME, WITH THIS
OWNERSHIP INTEREST TO NOT TRANSFER TO MACKEY UNTIL
THE TIME OF BAUGH'S DEATH (FINDING 21a) AND IN
THE RESULTING CONCLUSION THAT THE QUITCLAIM DEED
TO MACKEY SHOULD BE SET ASIDE (CONCLUSION 14).

That Baugh presently conveyed her entire interest in the
properties to Mackey is shown by the following: A) A fee simple
title is presumed to pass in a conveyance and delivery of a deed
is presumed when it is executed and recorded; B) Self-serving
testimony does not establish that the grantor intended the
conveyance to be testamentary in nature; C) Where there is no
contradictory evidence as to intent, the conveyance is presumed
to be present and binding; D) The trial court failed to consider
the significance of its finding that Baugh sought to place
negotiating pressure on Gleed, and this intention would be
defeated if no interest was presently conveyed to Mackey; and E)
The trial court failed to show in a logical manner how its
findings of fact were supported by the evidence, and incorrectly
interpreted the cases that it relied on in support of its
decision that Baugh lacked a present intent to convey her
properties.

These points will be discussed in turn.

8

A.

A Fee Simple Title Is Presumed To Be Intended To
Pass In A Real Estate Conveyance And When A Deed
Is Executed And Recorded There Is A Presumption Of
Delivery, Therefore, One Who Asserts The
Invalidity Of A Deed Must Do So By Clear And
Convincing Evidence,

When Baugh signed the document boldly emblazoned with the
title QUIT CLAIM DEED, she presently conveyed her entire interest
in the Baugh properties to Mackey.

The Utah Code states: "A fee

simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance
of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a
lesser estate was intended."

UTAH CODE UNANN.

§ 57-1-3 (1993).

Moreover, "[a] presumption of delivery arises where the deed has
been executed and recorded . . . ."

Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d

632, (Utah 1984) (upholding warranty deed because there was
present intent to convey a property interest).

"[0]ne who

asserts the invalidity of a deed must so prove by clear and
convincing evidence."

Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman,

413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966); See also, Pattee, 684 P.2d at 634.
As was stated in Allen v. Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah
1949)(holding earlier conveyance by quitclaim deed was binding
despite later conveyance),

,f

[t]he recording of the deed and

placing the names of others on the property is somewhat in the
nature of a public declaration that [the grantor] intended the
instrument to become effective immediately."
A number of Utah cases have addressed the question of
whether a deed is valid and binding because it is intended to
have immediate effect, or invalid because it is testamentary in
nature.

In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807
9

(Utah 1966), a deed that had been recorded was held to have been
delivered despite the fact the grantor retained possession of the
deed and continued to occupy the home and pay taxes on it.
Additionally, the Harman court pointed out the grantor's
"testimony that he did not intend to pass title prior to his
death is self-serving • . ." and was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of delivery.

413 P.2d at 810.

In First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi et ux.. 251 P.2d 297
(Utah 1952), a deed was held to be invalid because the grantor's
intent was testamentary in nature.

In Burgi the deed was not

recorded until after the grantor's death and there was
conflicting testimony about whether delivery of the deed had
occurred or not.

In O'Gara v. Findlay, 306 P.2d 1073 (Utah

1957), however, the court declined to follow Burgi because there
was no conflicting testimony about whether the grantor intended
delivery, and the court stated: "[I]n order to make a finding
that there was no delivery, the trial court would have to find
against the uncontradicted testimony, but such finding we refuse
to make."
In Burt et al. v. Burt et a h , 209 P.2d 217 (Utah 1949), a
deed was held invalid because the intent was testamentary in
nature.

However, there the deed was never recorded (despite

being in the possession of the grantee) and the court stated that
this was "[a] very strong point in favor . . . " of a finding the
deed was testamentary.

Id. at 220. Finally, in Allen v. Allen

et al., 204 P.2d 458 (Utah 1949), where a deed was found to be a
10

valid present conveyance and not testamentary, the court pointed
out, "[c]ertain it is, that [the grantor's] visit to her attorney
. . . and her signing of a paper that bears in its caption—in
large black letters—"Quit Claim Deed," would hardly lead one to
believe she had • . . executed a will."
Unlike in Burgi and Burt, the quitclaim deed from Baugh to
Mackey was recorded promptly after being executed.

The trial

court found the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed was duly recorded
on March 24, 1992 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions Law at 5),
well before Baugh's death on July 29, 1992. As indicated in
Burt, this is strongly indicative of a present—not testamentary-intent to convey real estate.

Moreover, while the trial record

is silent on who took physical possession of the deed and when,
there are indications it was given to Mackey.

First, the

quitclaim deed (which was admitted into evidence) states that tax
notices should be sent to 2512 N 475 W, Sunset, which is Mackey's
address.

Additionally, a tax notice was sent to this address and

Mackey planned to pay the taxes; however, before she could pay
the taxes Gleed paid them and changed the address to which tax
notices should be sent (Trial Transcript Volume II at 9-10).

In

any event, even if Baugh retained possession of the deed and had
continued paying taxes, this would not necessarily indicate a
lack of present intent to convey the property.

Controlled

Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966).
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B.

Self-Serving Statements Are Insufficient To
Overcome the Presumption of Delivery When A Deed
Is Executed And Recorded Because They Are Not
Clear And Convincing Evidence.

Since the recording of a deed raises the presumption of a
present intent to deliver the property—a presumption which is
afforded "great and controlling weight . . ."—it was the
respondent's burden to show Baugh did not intend a present
conveyance.

Harman. 413 P.2d at 809. Furthermore, the only

disinterested party who was present when Baugh signed the
quitclaim deed was Lori Brown, the associate of Associated Title
who prepared the deed (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at
9).

All other parties—Mackey, Baugh, Gleed—have a self-

interest regarding what was intended when Baugh signed and
recorded the quitclaim deed.

As was stated in Harman. self-

serving testimony about what was intended cannot overcome the
presumption of delivery after a deed is recorded.
810.

413 P.2d at

Therefore, in determining what Baugh intended when she

signed the quitclaim deed, Ms. Brown's testimony should be given
controlling weight.
Ms. Brown testified that on March 23, 1992, Baugh understood
the questions which were asked of her and appropriately answered
those questions (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9).
Under cross examination by respondent's counsel, Ms. Brown made
the following statements (Trial Transcript Volume III at 187):
Q
All right. So if the question then essentially
was, Mrs. Baugh, this is a quit claim deed and you
understand that, and her answer was?
A

Yes.
12

Q
Yes. And you understand by this quit claim deed
you are transferring your ownership interest in these
two properties to your—Penny Mackey, and she said yes?
A

Uh-huh.

As was stated in Allen, it can hardly be implied a grantor is
executing a will when she knowingly and willingly signs a
document with the caption Quit Claim Deed emblazoned on it. 204
P.2d at 460.
Moreover, Ms. Brown's testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Enoch Dangerfield (Trial Transcript Volume II at 157-58).

And

while Dr. Dangerfield indicated that on March 27, 1992 Baugh said
she wanted the property back (Trial Transcript Volume II at 15153), when a grantor changes their intent after having made a
binding conveyance, the conveyance remains valid and binding.
See Allen v. Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458 (Utah 1949).
Additionally, Baugh's statements that she wanted the property
back apparently were brought about by deed's campaign to have
the properties returned (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 173-76).
The trial court placed substantial weight on the case of
Curtiss v. Ferris, 452 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1969) when it concluded
Baugh did not intend to convey a present property interest.
(Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993, at 12-13).

However,

in that case the grantor's self-serving testimony partially
formed the basis for the decision.

Moreover, the Ferris court

stated "[t]he record is replete with other evidence consistent
with [the grantor's] claim to retention of full interest in the
property during her lifetime."

452 P.2d at 40. But unlike in
13

Ferris, the record in this case is hardly replete with indicia
that Baugh did not intend to convey a present interest.
Therefore the presumption of delivery and conveyance of all
property interests upon signing and recording of the March 23,
1992 quitclaim deed was not overcome by clear and convincing
evidence.

C.

The Only Evidence Presented As To Baugh's Intent
At The Time She Executed The Quitclaim Deed Was
That She Intended To Convey An Ownership
Interest. This Does Not Clearly And Convincingly
Show Lack Of Present Intent To Transfer A Property
Interest.

In addition to the fact that self-serving testimony should
be discounted when determing the intent of a grantor, it is also
important to consider whether there is any contradictory
testimony as to intent to make present delivery of a deed.

If

there is no contradictory testimony as to whether delivery of the
deed was intended, then the signing of a deed is valid and
binding.

O'Gara v. Findlay, 306 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1957).

In

Findlay an elderly woman conveyed property by deed to her nephew.
The nephew had been contacted by the elderly woman to aid in the
disposition of her property and the nephew accompanied the
decedent to a bank where the transaction was made.

The only

parties to the transaction were the decedent, the nephew, and the
bank president who prepared the deed.

At trial, the only

testimony as to the decedent's intent was the uncontroverted
testimony of the nephew and bank president that a present
conveyance was intended by the decedent.
14

On these facts the

court in Findlay held that a valid and binding present conveyance
of the property had been made.
Similarly, and as discussed above, Ms. Brown testified that
Baugh understood she was transferring her property to Mackey by
signing the quitclaim deed.

Moreover, Mackey also testified that

Baugh understood she was conveying her properties to Mackey by
signing the quitclaim deed (Trial Transcript Volume I at 127,
171-73).

Baugh was the only other party present when the deed

was signed, but the record is silent as to her intent at the time
the deed was signed due to her death.

Additionally, the

presumption that Baugh intended a present conveyance is not
negated by her later request to return the deed or expressed
desire to continue to live in her house until her death. See,
e.g., Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984); Controlled
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966); Allen v.
Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah 1949).

Since there was no

contradictory evidence as to intent, there was no clear and
convincing evidence that Baugh did not intend a present
conveyance of the properties.

Therefore Baugh's signing and

recording of the quitclaim deed should be held to have been a
valid and binding present conveyance.

15

D,

The Trial Court Failed To Consider Its Finding
Of Fact 21c, Which Shows That Baugh Must Have
Intended To Transfer A Property Interest When She
Executed And Delivered The Quitclaim Deed,

The trial court ignored the significance of one of its
findings of fact as it relates to whether a present interest was
conveyed.

The trial court found that when Baugh executed the

quit claim deed she intended "to place negotiating pressure on
the plaintiff Gleed to persuade him to convey to Mackey his joint
tenancy ownership interest in the Baugh Home in exchange for
Mackey conveying to him her joint tenancy ownership interest in
the Rental Home." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6).
However, nowhere does the trial court analyze the significance of
that intention vis-a-vis whether a present property interest was
conveyed to Mackey.

In Sweeney v. Sweeney,

11 A.2d 806 (Conn.

1940), where the purpose of making a deed was to protect the
grantee in case he predeceased the grantor but there was a
question as to whether effective delivery of the deed had
occurred, the court said: "Since this purpose would have been
defeated had there been no delivery with intent to pass title,
this conclusively establishes the fact that there was legal
delivery."

Likewise, if no title was passed when Baugh signed

the quitclaim deed, her intention of placing negotiating pressure
on Gleed would have been defeated.

Therefore, the trial court's

finding that "no present ownership interest" in either home was
conveyed (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 12) is
inconsistent and in error.

16

E.

The Trial Court Failed To Show In A Logical Manner
That Its Findings Of Fact Clearly And
Convincingly Established That Baugh Lacked A
Present Intent To Transfer A Property Interest,
Moreover, The Trial Court Incorrectly Applied The
Case Law When It Concluded That Baugh Lacked A
Present Intent To Transfer A Property Interest,

The trial court found that Baugh was lucid when she executed
the quitclaim deed, that she "acted with sufficient mental
capacity to comprehend the subject of [the] deed, its nature and
its probable consequences," and "acted with independent will and
judgment." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6, 9).
Additionally, the trial court found that the March 23, 1992
quitclaim deed from Baugh to Mackey was not the product of fraud
or undue influence.
11).

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at

Despite these findings, the trial court ruled that Baugh

lacked a present intent to transfer ownership of the properties,
and in so doing mistakenly relied on the following cases.
In Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), which the trial court relied on strongly in finding Baugh
did not presently intend to convey a property interest to Mackey
(Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993 at 10-11), the grantor
was found to have been subject to the undue influence of her
children and grandchildren.

Because of this, the Brinkerhoff

court ruled there was no present intent to transfer a property
interest, and invalidated the conveyances.

Yet Baugh did not

suffer from undue influence from Mackey, so it is not clear how
the trial court could use Brinkerhoff as support for its finding
Baugh had no intent to make a present conveyance of her
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properties.

Moreover, the trial court also relied on Baker v.

Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984), reciting that delivery of a
deed is not good without present intent to transfer a property
interest (Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993, at 12).
While this is certainly the law, in Pattee a deed was held to be
a valid and binding conveyance delivered with the necessary
intent.

Nevertheless, the trial court cited this case as support

for its finding that Baugh lacked the appropriate intent.
Finally, as discussed above, the trial court also incorrectly
relied on Curtiss v. Ferris, 452 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1969) to support
its conclusion Baugh lacked the necessary intent to transfer a
present interest.
These cases and the Findings of Fact fail to support the
Conclusion of Law that Baugh lacked the necessary intent to make
a present conveyance to Mackey.

As mentioned above, the findings

of fact show that Baugh was lucid, competent, understood the
nature of the transaction, and was not subject to undue influence
by Mackey.

Moreover, the bulk of the findings of fact relate to

Baugh's competence, not her intent.

(Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, items 23 and 24, at 6-9). Finally, the trial
court relied on written testimony and transcripts of
conversations that were never admitted into evidence in reaching
its decision (see Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993 at
12) .
In Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah
Ct.App. 1990) (construing intent of a testator and the language
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of a will), the court stated that:
The findings "must show that the court's judgment or
decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by,
the evidence.'" The findings also "'should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'"
(citations omitted).
Without sufficient information to allow adequate review, a
case should be remanded for the trial court to make "explicit,
detailed findings as to . . . the decedent's intent and how that
intent supports the court's conclusions."

Id. at 542-43.

Similarly, the record in this case simply fails to logically, and
clearly, support the trial courts ruling that Baugh lacked a
present intent to convey her property interest.

Therefore, as an

alternative to finding the quitclaim deed was a valid and binding
present conveyance, this Court should remanded this case for
further proceedings.

F.

Conclusion.

Since Baugh presently conveyed her entire interest in the
properties, she severed the joint tenancy that Baugh and Gleed
had shared and made Gleed and Mackey tenants in common.
Adams, 16630 (Utah 1980) (per curiam).

Close v.

In Adams an elderly

mother executed and delivered to her son a quitclaim deed to
property held in joint tenancy with her daughter.

The deed was

valid, which severed the joint tenancy and made the son and
daughter tenants in common.

Moreover, Mackey is entitled to one-

half of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
19

properties.

See First National Bank of Denver v. Groussman, 483

P.2d 398, (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (quitclaim deed to grandsons by
elderly woman severed joint tenancy with daughter, making
daughter and grandsons tenants in common).

In the alternative,

this case should be remanded for further findings regarding
Baugh's intent at the time she executed the quitclaim deed.

II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT BAUGH'S DESIRE TO REMAIN IN HER HOME
UNTIL HER DEATH CONSTITUTED AN INTENTION TO RETAIN A
LIFE ESTATE, WHILE GIVING MACKEY A VESTED REMAINDER
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES.

The trial court failed to recognized that a valid and
binding gift can be made where the grantor retains a life estate
and possession of the gift, with a present remainder interest
being conveyed to and vested in the grantee.

"The correct test

[of the validity of a gift] is "'whether the maker intended the
[gift] to have no effect until after the maker's death, or
whether he intended it transfer some present interest.'" " Gruen
v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 873 (N.Y. 1986)(citations omitted).
"[W]ith the gift of a remainder[,] title vests immediately in the
donee and any possession is postponed until the donor's death[,]
whereas under a will neither title nor possession vests
immediately."

Id. at 874. And while Gruen dealt with whether a

valid gift could be made where a life estate was retained in a
valuable painting, the court also recognized that a valid gift of
real property could be made despite retention of a life estate
and possession by the grantor.

Id. at 873.
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Moreover, in Gruen

the grantor did not specifically state that he was retaining a
life estate, he simply stated in a letter to the grantee that he
wanted to use the painting as long as he lived.

Id. at 871.

At the core of the trial court's error in failing to
recognize that a valid present property interest was vested in
Mackey upon execution and recordation of the quitclaim deed was
the fact that it failed to clearly distinguish ownership from
possession.

The trial record makes it abundantly clear Baugh

desired to live out her life in her home.

However, as the Gruen

court pointed out, simply wanting to retain possession of a gift
during ones life does not indicate no present interest has been
conveyed.

Strength is added to this contention because Baugh

also sought to place negotiating pressure on Gleed (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6) when she executed deed.

Since

no negotiating pressure could result unless Mackey had a valid
present interest in the properties with which to bargain, and
since it is admitted that Baugh wanted to retain possession of
her house during her life, the only other logical explanation of
her intent, if she did not intend to convey her full interest, is
that she conveyed a present remainder interest in the properties
to Mackey, but retained a life estate for herself.
It is also admitted that the quitclaim deed does not
explicitly retain a life estate while giving a remainder interest
to Mackey (See Addendum No. 1). However, there is support for
Appellants claim that this is what was intended.

For example,

the trial court stated H[a]nd I think clearly her intent
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throughout this was that she maintain a life interest and it be
her home during her life." (Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25,
1993 at 16)(emphasis added).

As discussed above, when coupled

with Baugh's intent to place negotiating pressure on Gleed the
most logical explanation of this intent is that the "life
interest" Baugh sought to retain was possession, not ownership.
Likewise, when Mackey said her grandmother said "I want my
granddaughter to have my home when I die" (Trial Transcripts
Volume I at 127, 172) it is likely that Baugh wanted Mackey to
assume possession of her home when she died, not ownership, which
was conveyed when the quitclaim deed was executed and recorded.
The case of Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984), also
indicates that a possessory life estate can be retained even if
it is not explicitly stated in a deed.

In that case, the grantor

"wanted assurance that she would always have a place to live in
comfort in return for deeding the property [to the grantees]."
Id. at 634. The deed, which was held to be valid and binding,
was executed and the elderly woman continued to live in the house
until she became too infirm; however, nowhere in Pattee is it
stated that an explicit life estate was retained.
Where a life estate is retained, a quitclaim deed severing a
joint tenancy and creating a tenancy in common is valid.

See

First National Bank of Denver v. Groussman, 483 P.2d 398 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1971).

See also Allen v. Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458

(Utah 1949). In Groussman, an elderly woman who was a joint
tenant with her daughter executed a quitclaim deed to her
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grandsons, reserving a life estate interest in the property for
herself.

The deed was held to be a valid present conveyance

which severed the existing joint tenancy.

The Groussman court

went on to state:
The instrument did not . . . vest the [grantees] with
their interest in the property only upon the death of
the grantor, but instead granted them a present,
vested, non-revocable interest in the property at the
time of the execution of the deed. There is no
requirement that a deed comply with the statutory
requirement of a will.
483 P.2d at 402. As the Groussman court made clear, retaining
full use and possession of property does not make a deed
testamentary.

That construction only arises if the grantor

retains the right to terminate the interest of the grantee at any
time before the grantor's death.

Baugh did not retain any right

to revoke the conveyance to Mackey since the deed was duly
delivered and recorded to Mackey (see discussion above).
Therefore, when Baugh executed the deed retaining an implied life
estate for herself she: 1) Severed the joint tenancy she shared
with Gleed; and 2) Vested Mackey with a present remainder
interest in the property, making Mackey a tenant in common with
Gleed upon Baugh's death.

As discussed above, Mackey is

therefore entitled to one half of the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the properties.

23

See Id. at 402.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court in setting aside the
quitclaim deed to Mackey should be reversed and the validity of
the deed upheld on the basis that: 1) There was no evidence to
support the finding that Mackey did not have the requisite intent
for a present transfer of her property interest to Mackey when
she executed and recorded the deed on March 23, 1992; and 2) On
the further basis that no such evidence attains the required
standard of "clear and convincing."
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for further findings as to the basis for the court's
conclusions and enunciation of the standard of proof used in
reaching its findings and conclusions.

DATED this

A
in

day of July, 1994.

Nathan Hult
Attorney for Appellant
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
(801)-753-7400
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ADDENDUM
March 23, 1992 Quitclaim Deed From Baugh to Mackey
February 14, 1990 Warranty Deed From Baugh to Gleed and Baugh
Judgment of Judge Jon M. Memmott
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993
Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1986)
Sweeney v. Sweeney, 11 A.2d 806 (Conn. 806)

26

Recorded at R«qut«t of...
,l

-

•

-

M. F « , p«id 5.

fa

y

__

.-. '•
-

D.P. Book

M

P.je

M.i. Ux nouc. t o . U

~"

-r-

Addr^^a^.„lZ5...^........4^i,.^

QUIT CLAIM DEED
LOUISE L. DAUCH
, County of

of
LAYTON
QUIT CLAIM
to

fr*ntor
, StaU of Utah, hereby

DAVIS

PENNY L. MACKEY
frantM
for tha turn of
DOLLARS
County,

of
the following dis«crib«l tract

of land in

DAVIS

Stata of Utah, to wit:

ALL OF LOT U , BLOCK 1 , CRAND VIEW ACRES, EXCEPT THE NORTH . 3 0 FEET THEREOF.
ALL OF LOT 1 3 , nLOCK i , CRAND VIEW ACRES. ALSO THE NORTH . 3 0 FEET OF LOT 1 4 .

E* « ? < £ * O S 3 BK 1 4 8 1 P6
3
CAROL DEAN PAGEr DAVIS CHTY RECORDER
1??2 rtAR 24 ? : 2 o Art FEE 7 . 5 0 DEP ft£C
KEC'O FOR nACKE;# PENNY I .

RETURNED
MAR 2 41992
WITNESS tba band

of laid fivxtor

, tnia 23

Signed in tba prmaanca of

^*y ot

7

19 92

MARCH

LOUISE L . BAUCH

^

NOTARY I'UBLIC

torn enov/fi
• 9 4 7 * <r»n!h

O^aoivvjun 5OTT

My Cc«nmiMi«n £ip«roa
OeccmtMf 1.1S94

STATE G? UTAH,

flTATE OF UTAH
County of

DAVIS

On tba

2 3 **7 ol

MAK CH

i d 92
partonaily appaartd btiort I

3
II

LOUISE L. DAUCH
iba ttfnar

of tba foraf olsf Inatrumant, who duly acknowladf^d to ma) thai

t> B «

ftiMuud

J&teuL^.
yO
|£y commlaaioa

Notoxy
PuUia, r*»4»f »l
NotoxyPuUia,

iha urn*.

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

> 4 a ck ~<Lw\CA \JLw\

&

GRANTEE'S ADDRESS

FT S " ° ^ " ^ 1

CAROL*DEAlTpAGEf DAVIS CNTY RECORDER
1 ? ? 0 FEB U
l l s 5 7 Ari F E
~ < A i1QOn
^
7.00 DEP MB
y y U
FEB 1 4
REC'D FOR BAUGH, LOUISE

WARRANTY DEED
LOUISE L. BAUGH
CLEARFIELD

of

CONVEY

and WARRANT

AKA LOUISE BAUGH

County of

Jf?

DAVIS

g

t

grtntor

State of Utah, hereby

to

LOUISE L . BAUGH AND ERNEST K. GLEED, AS JOINT TENANTS, WITH FULL
RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP.
grantee
of
for the turn of

County
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

, State of Utah
DOLLARS

DAVIS

the following described tract of land in

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
ALL OF LOT 1 4 , BLOCK 1 , GRAND VIEW ACRES SUBDIVISION, SECTION 3 5 , TOWNHIP 5 NORTH
RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, EXCEPT THE VOR'U . 3 0 FEET THEREOF IN
THE CITY OF CLEARFIELD, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF.
14-091-0014, 0013
ALL OF LOT 13, BLOCK 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES SUBDIVISION, SECTION 35, TOWNSHIP 5 NORTH
RNAGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE ADN MERIDIAN, ALSO THE NORTH .30 FEET OF LOT 14 IN '
THE CITY OF CLEARFIELD, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF.

day of

WITNESS the hand of said grantor ,thti

A.D. 19

Signed in the pretence of
LOUISE L. BAUGH AKA LOUISE BAUGH

STATE OF UTAH
SS.
COUNTY OF

DAVIS
On the

li

day of

Peb.

A . D . 19 $0

appeared before me
LOUISE L. BAUGH
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
tU<u>

Notary Public
Residing at
A S S O C I A T E D TITLE C O M P A N Y
Order No

My Comm.sslon Expires:

•>;vT'27;ffV

personally

2^

FiLEDIN CLERK'S OFFICE

JAH
PHILIP C. PATTERSON - 2540

27

CLERK, ^

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-7704

3 2n PH f M
./:!

COl.kT

BY
DE~'Ur CLEP.X

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ERNEST K. GLEED AND LOUISE L.
BAUGH,
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vs.
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PENNY L. MACKEY,
Judge Jon M. Memmott
Defendant.
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to the court without a jury on
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Ernest
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present and represented by his retained attorney of record Philip
C. Patterson.

Verlin L. Gleed, in his capacity as the personal

representative of the Estate of Louise L. Baugh, deceased, and as
the substituted

party

plaintiff

for Louise

L. B a u g h ,

was

represented by Philip C. Patterson, one of the attorneys for the
Estate of Louise L. Baugh, deceased.
and represented

The defendant was present

by her attorney of record Jan P. Malmberg.

The

court announced its ruling from the bench before the parties and
respective counsel on August 25, 1993.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ERNEST K. GLEED AND LOUISE L.
BAUGH,
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5.

The p l a i n t i f f

Ernest K. Gleed i s one of five surviving

children of Louise L. Baugh, deceased.
6.

The d e f e n d a n t

L o u i s e L.

Penny

Mackey

is

a

grandchild

of

Percy

Baugh.

Percy

Baugh

of

Baugh.

7.

Louise

L,

Baugh

c h i l d r e n were born a s i s s u e
on J a n u a r y 7 ,
8.

this

marriage.

No
died

1990.

During

at

was t h e widow

of

the

1950fs,

late

t e n a n c y o w n e r s h i p of c e r t a i n
located

L.

the

improved

374 N. 75 W., C l e a r f i e l d ,

more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s

Baughs a c q u i r e d

residential
Utah,

real

which r e a l

joint

property

property

is

follows:

A l l of Lot 1 3 , Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES, a l s o t h e
N o r t h .30 f e e t of Lot 14. (Tax ID No. 1 4 - 0 9 1 - 0 0 1 3 ) .
The B a u g h s o c c u p i e d c o n t i n u o u s l y

this property

as

Baugh's

their

Louise

residence

Baugh

until

continued

to

Percy

coccupy

("The Baugh Home")

January

this

7,

home u n t i l

1990

deafh.

her July 29,

1992 d e a t h .
9.
acquired
property
property

During
joint

the

first

part

of

the

1960's,

the

Baughs

t e n a n c y o w n e r s h i p of t h e i m p r o v e d r e s i d e n t i a l

located

at

362 N. 75 W.,

Clearfield,

i s more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s

Utah,

which

follows:

A l l of Lot 14, Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES e x c e p t t h e
N o r t h .30 f e e t t h e r e o f .
(Tax ID No. 1 4 - 0 9 1 - 0 0 1 4 ) .

real
real

This

property

is adjacent

Baughs r e n t e d
until

this

property

continuously

1990

10.

been

Louise
for

Baugh

chronic

husband's January 7,
11.
during

the

February
the

14,

13*

(a)

Rental

Home")

medical

t o and

January

The R e n t a l

14,

The

doctor

following

her

7,

1990 d e a t h

and

terminated

his

Nevada

Home t o p r o v i d e day t o day

1990, L o u i s e Baugh e x e c u t e d a w a r r a n t y
in

Baugh

County

joint

tenancy

Home a n d

The

Recorder

was d u l y

to h e r s e l f

Rental

recorded

on F e b r u a r y

14,

and

Home.
in

the

to

This
Office

1990 a s E n t r y No.

1336 a t Page 6 9 2 .

When e x e c u t i n g

L o u i s e Baugh

prior

K. G l e e d

1990 w a r r a n t y d e e d

in Book

interest

into

she conveyed

Gleed

Davis

882819,

receiving

Baugh's

Ernest

On F e b r u a r y

K.

("The

The

mother.

by w h i c h

Ernest

Percy

and moved

12.

The Baugh Home,

1990 d e a t h .

same m o n t h ,

care for his

had

of

death.

lung disease

Following

employment

of

south

Percy Baugh1s J a n u a r y 7 ,

treatment

deed

t o and

the February

14,

1990 w a r r a n t y

deed,

intended:
to

then

convey

to

Ernest

K. G l e e d

a joint

tenancy

i n The R e n t a l Home, and

(b)

to

retain

The Baugh Home w i t h
Gleed u n t i l
14.
1990 d e e d ,

all

this

ownership interest
ownerhsip

t h e t i m e of h e r
At t h e

time

interest

possessed
to

not

by h e r

transfer

in
to

death.

Louise

Baugh

she:

-4-

executed

the

February

14,

(a)
the

acted

subject

of

consequences,

and

(b)

in-patient
16.

this

its

capacity

nature

chronic

hospitalization

during January

and

lived

in

remained t h e f a v o r i t e

in

resulted

years

The Baugh

in

The M a c k e y s

S t a t e of Utah d u r i n g November
18.
Utah,

Following

Penny

grandmother
once

or

twice

the

State

her

November
her

relationship

a week,

returned

deed

by

which

she

on March

of

Utah

of

always

seeing

conveyed

1992 i n t h e

into

year

b e c a u s e of

permanently

return

close

her

and

to

to

the

relationship
bathing

as

much

to

his
the

as

State

of

with

her

Louise

Baugh

possible

and

companionship.

P e n n y Mackey

her

a

quit-claim

entire

joint

i n The Baugh Home and The R e n t a l Home.

The March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m
24,

1982,

periods

Home and

On March 2 3 , 1992, L o u i s e Baugh e x e c u t e d

tenancy ownership i n t e r e s t
20.

1990

included

p r o v i d i n g L o u i s e Baugh w i t h a f f e c t i o n
19-

1990.

1990.

Mackey c o n t i n u e d
which

her

g r a n d d a u g h t e r of t h e B a u g h s .

Penny Mackey r e s i d e d

commitments.

in

until

extended

1985 when s h e and h e r h u s b a n d moved from t h e s t a t e
career

probable

1990 and November

Home f o r

s e v e r a l summers l i v i n g

comprehend

its

lung disease

The Baugh

to

judgment.

From Penny M a c k e y ' s e a r l y c h i l d h o o d

spent

17.

deed,

mental

Louise Baugh's

frequently

time,

sufficient

a c t e d w i t h an i n d e p e n d e n t w i l l and

15.

she

with

Office

E n t r y No. 964083 in Book 1481 a t

of

deed

recorded

t h e D a v i s County R e c o r d e r

Page 0 0 0 3 .

-5-

was d u l y

as

21.

When e x e c u t i n g

L o u i s e Baugh

to

retain

The Baugh Home w i t h

1990

ownerhsip

deed

had

him h e r j o i n t

pressure

to

indicate

March 2 3 ,

period

deceased,

testified

transfer

in
to

the

February

a joint

tenancy

for

her

tenancy

Mackey

had

on March

ownership
to

Home.

the

23,

Gleed

conveying

in The R e n t a l

ability

to

1992 when s h e

deed.

presented

Louise

plaintiff

the

Baugh,

interest

following

was n o t
in

evidence

competent

The Baugh

on

Home and

Home:

(a)

levels,

the

Gleed

1992 t o q u i t - c l a i m

The R e n t a l

his joint

p e r i o d s and

e x e c u t e d t h e March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m
The p l a i n t i f f

that

on t h e

exchange

L o u i s e Baugh had l u c i d

23.

by h e r

Home, and

t o Mackey

She had a l u c i d

not

t o Gleed

tenancy ownership i n t e r e s t

understand.

to

her i n t e n t i o n

i n The R e n t a l

him t o c o n v e y

possessed

interest

conveyed

i n The Baugh Home i n

22.

deed,

death,

to place negotiating

persuade

interest

this

warranty

(c)

1992 q u i t - c l a i m

ownership interest

to leave undisturbed

ownership i n t e r e s t

to

all

t h e t i m e of B a u g h 1 s

Mackey u n t i l

14,

March 2 3 ,

intended:

(a)

(b)

the

Dr.
that

she

Alan

Abdulla,

b e c a u s e of h e r d i s e a s e ,

did

not

1992,

(b)

Abdulla

Dr.
the

her

behavior,

had

day a f t e r

not

seen

t h e March

-6-

Louise
23,

Baugh

physician,

and

have the r e q u i s i t e mental c a p a c i t y

deed on March 2 3 ,

appointment

Louise Baugh1s t r e a t i n g

her

C02

t o make a

prior

1992 q u i t - c l a i m

to

her
deed

transfer

f o r a period of seven months and was not v i s i t i n g her on

a continual

basis,

(c)

Dr.

independent
basis.

Abdulla

medical

persons

The t e s t i m o n y

not p r e s e n t e d t o t h e
(d)
Baugh of

a

nurse

were

visiting

seeing

of an o n - g o i n g

plus

Baugh of
did

not

Mrs.

Baxter,

years,

a neighbor

testified

Bruna C o f f e y ,

thirty-five
have t h e

years,

requisite

n a t u r e of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n ,
(f)

Diana Gleed,

Baugh w o u l d

have

perform c e r t a i n
(g)

although

daily

of

and

capacity

lack

believed

Louise

friend

of

Louise

s h e b e l i e v e d L o u i s e Baugh
to

understand

the

Nancy McEntee, a n e i g h b o r ,

Gleed!s

Ernest

Louise

capacity,

testified
mental

she

of

of

wife,

testified

memory and

Louise

inability

to

tasks,
Baughfs

sons,

likewise testified

their

convincing

and

c a r e p r o v i d e r was

and f r i e n d

that

a neighbor

as a l s o did

instances

Louise

James G l e e d ,

Baugh

Baugh on a

medical

Baugh d i d n o t have t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l
(e)

Mrs.

Mrs,

court,

M r s . Geneva
fifty

had

testimony

Larry

Gleed,

Verlin

G l e e d and

a s t o t h e l a c k of m e n t a l

carried

less

weight

b e c a u s e of t h e i r l a c k of f r e q u e n t

and

contact

capacrity
was

with

less

Louise

Baugh , and
(h)

Ernest

Gleed

likewise

testified

that

l a c k of memory and l a c k of c a p a c i t y

to u n d e r s t a n d .

Gleed!s

inconsistencies.

testimony

i n t h e s p r i n g of
great

detail

had

substantial

h i s m o t h e r had
However,
He

1992 t h a t L o u i s e Baugh would d i s c u s s

the

transaction

that

occurred

in

Mr.

testified

with

him

relation

in

to a

home w h i c h h * d

Sunset

been p r e v i o u s l y

from h e r g r a n p a r e n t s -

He a l s o

testified

had c o n v e r s a t i o n s

with

Baugh would r e l a t e

to the p l a i n t i f f

nature

of

amounts
were

the defendant

the conversations,

for

rent

with

on a c o n v e r s a t i o n

n a t u r e of l e g a l

transactions,

The d e f e n d a n t

rent

in

money
and

deed's

c o u l d not c a r r y

24.

Mackey

was owed,

Ernest

that

Gleed,

the

money t h a t

inconsistent

purchased

Louise

great

detail,

the

was owed,

the

testimony
not

testimony

to indicate

March 2 3 ,

1992 t o t r a n s f e r

Louise

a one-half

Louise

details

which

that

she

understand

the

Mackey, on t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

following

had

which

other

coald

Baugh

after

that

prior

and

by Penny Mackey

presented

Baugh was c o m p e t e n t

interest

the
on

i n The Baugh Home

and i n The R e n t a l Home:
(a)

Dr.

Enoch

Baush was c o m p e t e n t ,
particularly
23,

understood

understood

the

of

(b)
were

transcripts

quite

persuasive

of t h e d e e d
(c)

the

of

based

of

the

on h i s

with

that

Mrs.

Louise

conversations,
transaction
review

Louise

of

and

of March
recorded

Baugh

and

the

parties,

the

understood

the n a t u r e

conversations

d e p o s i t i o n s of t h e

testified

nature

1992 and t h e deed t r a n s f e r ,

transcripts

and

Dangerfield

nature

of

were
that

likewise
Mrs.

r e v i e w e d by t h e

Baugh

was

court

competent,

c o n v e r s a t i o n s and u n d e r s t o o d

the

nature

transaction,
Mr. W i l l i a m

and work a s s o c i a t e

Hadfield,

of Mr.

Percy

a friend
Baugh,

of o v e r t h i r t y

testified

that

years
Louise

Baugh

understood

business

transactions

Robbins,

a friend

and

the

transfer

of

property,
(d)

Jean

a s s o c i a t e for over t h i r t y
herself

from

Louise

Baugh,

Baugh had a s i g n i f i c a n t
(e)
prepared

Lori
the

understood

the

appropriately

Louise

and who had

testified

to

the associate

the

testified

questions

answered

that

court

and

an

training

that

Louise

transactions,

Associated

Title

who

on March 2 3 , 1992, Mrs. Baugh

which

those

of

Baugh

received

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b u s i n e s s

Brown,

deed,

years,

of

were

asked

questions.

of

Louise

a p p e a r e d t o h e r t o be c o m p e t e n t and u n d e r s t o o d

the

her

and

Baugh

also

nature

of

the

proceeding.
25.
had

While t h e

subjected

functions

at

her

progression
to

the

loss

of

Louise

of

intellectual

the

time

she executed

acted

with

sufficient

Baugh's lung
and

t h e March 2 3 , 1992

disease
memory

quit-claim

she:
(a)
the

subject

of

consequences,

and

(b)
26.
in-patient

this

deed,

mental

its

nature

a c t e d w i t h an i n d e p e n d e n t w i l l
Louise Baughfs c h r o n i c
hospitalization

preceding her July 29,

lung

during

capacity
and

and

its

probable

judgment.

disease

April

t o comprehend

necessitated

1992 and

her

immediately

1992 d e a t h .
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The

jurisdiction

properly vested with t h i s

and

court.

venue

of

this

action

are

each

2

*

The p r e s u m p t i o n u n d e r Utah Law i s t h a t

competent unless

c l e a r and

convincing

t h e c o u r t which e s t a b l i s h e d
3.

deficient
23,

evidence

that

of t h e d e e d ,

its

to

of

the

with

clear

faculties

execution

of

14,

consequences

and

were so

the

March
subject

and

could

thereto.
sufficient

mental

capacity

1990 w a r r a n t y deed and t h e March

E r n e s t K. Gleed o c c u p i e d a r e c o g n i z e d

law c o n f i d e n t i a l

relationship

at

February

the

to

deed.

The p l a i n t i f f

time

establish

probable

in r e l a t i o n

both the February

5.

presented

she d'id n o t comprehend t h e

n a t u r e and i t s

1992 q u i t - c l a i m

the

time

L o u i s e L. Baugh p o s s e s s e d

execute

23,

to

Louise Baugh's mental

deed t h a t

not a c t w i t h d i s c r e t i o n
4.

failed

or impaired a t t h e

1992 q u i t - c l a i m

is

is

incompetency.

The p l a i n t i f f s

convincing

evidence

L o u i s e Baugh

with

14,

his

mother,

Louise

L.

at

Baugh,

1990 w a r r a n t y deed was e x e c u t e d

by

her.
6.

The d e f e n d a n t

law c o n f i d e n t i a l
Baugh,

at

qui t - c l a i m
7.

the

relationship

time

the

with

latter

her

occupied

a recognized

grandmother,

executed

the

March

Louise
23,

at
L.

1992

deed.
As a named

1990 w a r r a n t y d e e d ,
real

Penny Mackey

property

joint

tenancy

grantee

E r n e s t K. Gleed b e n e f i t e d

conveyance.

in the February
from

the

14,

described

A

Ac, f .
^A g r a n t e e w i t h i n t h e March 2 3 , 1992 quit-*
•
^ cne narn^
deed, penny M ^ k e y b e n e f i t e d from t h e d e s c r i b e d
real
u

claim

property

A

conveyance*

9.

In

s flinch a s

a

confidential

relationship

between E r n e s t K. Gleed and L o u i s e Baugh and between
and

Louise

Baugh,

transaction

tfas

each

fair

party

and

not

had

the

burden

the

result

of

of

existed

Penny

Mackey

proving

fraud

or

the

undue

influence.
10.

Neither the February

14, 1990 warranty deed nor the

March 23, 1992 quit-claim deed were obtained from Louise Baugh as
a result of fraud.
11.
influence.

No elements of fraud were raised or proved.

The deed transactions were not the result of undue
Neither the February

14, 1990 warranty deed nor the

March 23, 1992 quit-claim deed were obtained from Louise Baugh as
a product of undue influence.
12.

The joint tenancy

interest in The Baugh Home conveyed

by the plaintiff Louise Baugh to the plaintiff Ernest K. Gleed
under the February

14, 1990 warranty deed should be set aside a*s

a null and void conveyance for the reason that Baugh did not then
intend

to convey

to Gleed

a present joint tenancy

ownership

interest in this property.
13-

The joint tenancy interest in The Rental Home conveyed

by the plaintiff Louise Baugh to the plaintiff Ernest k. Gleed
under

the February

1 4 , 1990 warranty

deed should be deemed

a valid and enforceable conveyance for the reason that Baugh did

not

then

intend

to

ownership i n t e r e s t
14.
for
to

the

convey

in t h i s

The March 23

to

Gleed

a

present

joint

tenancy

property.

1992 q u i t - c l a i m deed s h o u l d

be s e t

r e a s o n t h a t L o u i s e L. Baugh d i d n o t t h e n i n t e n d

P e n n y L. Mackey a p r e s e n t

ownership

interest

in

aside

t o convey

either

The

Baugh Home or The R e n t a l Home.
15.

Each

party

should

bear

Each

party

should

bear

attorney

fees

individually

incurred.
16.

court

costs

individually

incurred.

DATED t h i s

55 -

day

of"3

TT^JYL

, 199^

nl\qAM^^

THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT
District Court Judge

IN THW-ISTRTCT COURT OF THE SEC(

Dl STRICT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVTS

2
3

l\AJl^w4U w v

KJO.

-ST

4
5

LOUISE L. BAUGH, ERNEST K. GJ.EEU.

6

PLAINTIFF,
CARE NO

920700 1 ^I

7
VS.
8
PENNY MACKBY,
9
DEFENDANT.
10
11
12

BE TT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 20TH DAY OF
AUGUST, 1993, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE CAME ON FOR TRIAL
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT JUDGF,
FARMINGTON, UTAH.

13
14

APPEARANCES

15
FOR THE PLAINTIFF

PHI 1.1.7 P C PATTERSON
PATTERSON & BARKTNG
427 27TH STREET
OGDEN, UT 84401

FOR THE DEFENDANT

JAN P. MA1.MRERG
ATTORNEY AT LAW
29 WEST 100 NORTH
LOGAN, UT 84321

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

JOANNE PRATT, CSR
HALL OF JUSTICE
800 WEST STATE STREET
FARMINGTON, UT 84025

24
25

COP*

I

AUGUST 2b,

2
3

THE COURT:

1993.

THE COURT IS HERE TO ISSUE A

4

RULING FOLLOWING THE BENCH TRIAL IN ERNEST GLEED VERSUS

5

PENNY MACKEY, CIVIL 920700131.

6

ABOUT EVIDENCE AND TRIAL THAT THE COURT CONSIDERED THAT I

7

THINK

8

THIS, DEPOSITIONS WERE PUBLISHED, BUT LAST EVENING AND

9

THIS MORNING WHEN I WENT TO GET THE DEPOSITIONS TO REVIEW

JUST A COUPLE OF COMMENTS

I NEED TO CLARIFY BEFORE I ISSUE THE RULING.

IN

10

THEM, THEY HAD NOT BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT.

AND SO I

31

DIDN'T HAVE ANY DEPOSITIONS TO READ EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD

12

BEEN PUBLISHED, AND SO I WAS NOT ABLE TO READ THE

13

DEPOSITIONS.

14

THINK

15

ABLE TO DO THAT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT FILED AND HADN'T

16

BEEN FILED, THE ORIGINALS, WITH THE COURT.

17

DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY ARK OR WHERE THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

18

BUT THEY WERE NOT Fr LED WITH THE COURT.

19

I THINK I WANT TO CLARIFY BEFORE I ISSUE THE RULING IS

20

THAT I THINK EARLY IN THE PLEADINGS, THERE WAS A PLEADING

21

THAT THERE WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR PENNY MACKEY IN

22

RECEIVING THE HOME.

2i

THERE WAS

24

MAYBE UNFORTUNATELY V N THIS CASE, AT LEAST FROM THE

25

COURT'S PERSPECTIVE IN LISTENING TO THE CASE AND THE

IT WAS SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO DO AND I

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT.

AND ONE

BUT I HAVEN'T BEEN

AND SO I

THE OTHER THING

-- AND THAT AS A RESULT

---- I THINK MUCH OF THE EVIDENCE AND I THINK

2

1

TRIAL, MOcfl^' THE EVIDENCE AND THE T J ^ K OF THIS TRIAL

2

WAS WHO DESERVED TO GET THE HOME, WHO HAD DONE THE MOST

3

FOR LOUISE AND AS A RESULT WHO DESERVED THE HOME.

4

THINK THAT WAS UNFORTUNATE IN THE WAY THE EVIDENCE WAS

5

PRESENTED IN THE TRIAL BECAUSE I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WAS

6

AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.

7

SOME PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THIS THAT PROBABLY

8

SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN CREATED IN THIS TYPE OF TRIAL.

9

AND I

AND I THINK IT COLORED OR CREATED

WITH THAT THEN, THE COURT WILL MAKE THE

10

FOLLOWING RULING

IN THE CASE.

FIRST, I THINK THE ISSUES

11

THAT ARE BEFORE THE COURT —

12

COMPETENCY OF LOUISE BAUGH AND THE ISSUE OF UNDUE

13

INFLUENCE OF PENNY MACKEY.

14

THE COURT HAS FOUND AN ADDITIONAL

15

CRITICAL

16

THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO TRANSFER PRESENT INTEREST IN THE

17

PROPERTY WHEN THE DEEDS WERE CONVEYED, AND NOT JUST THE

18

IN.LT.IAli DEED HUT PKOBAHLY THE

19

WITH THAT THE COURT USED THE FOLLOWING STANDARD OF REVIEW

20

SO THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE REVIEW THAT THE COURT USED

2 1.

IN DEALING WITH THIS.

22

BELIEVES THAI' THE BEST STANDARD OK THE BEST SUMMARY OF

23

THE STANDARD AS SET FORTH

24

A'J' 7 5b P. 2D 95 WHICH

25

JN 1988.

THERE WERE THE ISSUES OF

AND THEN WITH THAT, I THINK
ISSUE THAT I THINK WAS

IN THE COURT'S DECISION, AND THAI' WAS WHETHER

1990 DEED JN ADDITION.

AS TO COMPETENCY, THE COURT

IN ANDERSON VERSUS BRINKERHOFF,

r-& A UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

AND IN THAT, THE LAW THAT GUIDES THE COURT IN

"*

1

DEALING W T ^ P THIS

2

RATHER THAN

3

MRS. BAUGH WAS COMPETE UNLESS PROVED TO THE CONTRARY AS

4

PRESENTED.

5

COMPETENCY MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR, COGENT

6

SATISFACTORY AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 11

7

WHETHER A GRANTOR HAS SUFFICIENT MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE

8

A DEED

9

OR IMPAIRED THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT POWER TO

\S

IS WHETHER THE LAW I^JSUMES COMPETENCY

1NCOMPETENCY.

SO THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT

AND THAT ALSO ESTABLISHE'S THAT "MENTAL

"THE TEST

WHETHER THE MENTAL FACULTIES WERE SO DEFICIENT

10

COMPREHEND THE SUBJECT OF THE DEED, ITS NATURE AND ITS

11

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, AND TO ACT WITH THE DISCRETION IN

32

RELATION THERETO."

13

CARTER.

14

THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT."

15

STATE THAT "NEITHER OLD AGE, SICKNESS OR EXTREME

lb

INCAPACITATES A PARTY FROM DJSPOSING OF HIS PROPERTY IF

17

HE HAS POSSESSION OF HIS MENTAL FACULTIES AND UNDERSTANDS

18

THE BUSINESS

19

AND THEN JT CITES PETERSON VERSUS

AND ALSO "CAPACITY

IS MEASURED AT THE TIME OF
AND JT ALSO GOES ON TO
DISTRESS

IN WHICH HE IS ENGAGED."

AND IN THAT REGARD, 1 THINK THERE IS

20

SIIBSTANTI AL CONFLICTING EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED

21

BEFORE THE COURT AS TO THE

22

THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE BASED ON THAT STANDARD,

23

WHICH WOULD

24

WERE SO DEFICIENT THAT—SHE DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO

25

COMPREHEND TMK SUBJECT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED.

ISSUE OF COMPETENCY.

I THINK

LND1CATE THAT LOUISE BAUGH*S MENTAL FACULTIES

4

1

AND 1 ' ^ N K

MOST OF THE TESTIMONY ^ i T

THE PLAINTIFF

2

PRESENTED HAD TO DO WITH HER UNDERSTANDING OF THE

3

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND JUST LACK OF CAPACITY OR

4

UNDERSTANDING OF DEEDS AND WHAT THEY MEANT TO CONVEY.

5

THINK IN DR. ABDULLA'S OPINION THAT HE BELIEVED HER

6

BEHAVIOR,

7

LEVELS, PREVENTED HER FROM HAVING THE CAPACITY.

8

COURT,

9

CONCERN OF THE FACT THAT HE HADN'T SEEN HER FOR

I

BECAUSE OF HER DISEASE AND PARTICULARLY HER C02

IN EVALUATING DR.

ABDULLA'S TESTIMONY,

THE
HAD SOME

10

APPROXIMATELY

SEVEN MONTHS AND WAS NOT VISITING ON A

LL

CONTINUAL BASIS.

L2

THAT EVIDENCE AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD A NURSE VISITING

li

HER AND SHE HAD CARE OF THE NURSES.

14

WAS NOT RECEIVED BY THE COURT.

It)

OK THK PEOPLE

16

HER ON A DAILY BASIS WAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT.

17

ALSO PRESENTED TESTIMONY MRS. GENEVA BAXTER, A NEIGHBOR,

18

WHO ALSO BELIEVED THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY

J9

BASED ON HKR hO PLUS YEARS IN FRIENDSHIP.

20

A NEIGHBOR OK

21

SHE HAD THE CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION TO

22

UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THK TRANSACTION, AS DID ALSO

23

NANCY MOINTEK, A NEIGHBOR.

24

ALSO TESTIFIED LlKEWd^E AND J THJNK GAVE SEVERAL

25

OK

THE COURT ALSO HAD SOME CONCERN WITH

AND THAT TESTIMONY

AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE

-- AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL PERSON THAT SAW
PLAINTIFF

BRUNA COFFEY,

i5 YEARS, .INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT FEEL

ERNIE'S WIFE, DIANA GLEED,
EXAMPLES

INSTANCES OK LACK OF MEMORY, THE INABILITY TO PERFORM

1

CERTAJN^wSKS.

THE COURT ALSO R E C I T E D THE TESTIMONY OF

2

THE SONS LARRY GLEED, VERLLN GLEED AND JAMES GLEED WHO IN

3

RELATION TO THAT TESTIMONY

4

WEIGHT AND LESS CONVINCING THAN OTHER TESTIMONY BECAUSE

5

OF THEIR LACK OF CONTACT.

6

ISOLATED COMPARED TO THE OTHER PARTIES.

7

IN REVIEWING MR. ERNIE GLEED'S TESTIMONY IN WHICH HE

8

LNDiCATED SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF INCONSISTENT OR BEHAVIOR

9

THAT SHOWED LACK OK MEMORY, LACK OF CAPACITY TO

I THINK PROBABLY CARRIED LESS

AND 1 THINK THEIR CONTACT WAS
THE COURT ALSO

10

UNDERSTAND, THAT THE COURT ALSO FOUND SOME SUBSTANTIAL

11

I NCONSJ STENCIES IN MR. GLEED'S TESTIMONY AS TO MRS.

12

HAUGH'S UNDERSTANDING BECAUSE IN CERTAIN OCCASIONS I

13

THINK HE INDICATED AND TESTIFIED THAT THERE WERE TIMES IN

J4

WHICH

JS

HAUGH WOULD DISCUSS WITH HIM IN GREAT DETAIL THE

lb

TRANSACTIONS THAT OCCURRED

17

HOME

18

WITH PENNY

19

MRS. HAUGH WOULD RELATE TO MR. GLEED THE NATURE OF THE

20

CONVERSATIONS, THE RENT MONhY WAS OWED, THE AMOUNT OF

21

RENT MONEY THAT WAS OWED, DETAILS THAT TO THE COURT WERE

22

(JUITE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRIOR TESTIMONY THAT SHE

21

COULD NOT CARRY ON SUCH CONVERSATION.

24

REMEMBER DETAILS.

25

THE TRANSACTION.

--- IN THE SPRING Oh

1992 —

IN WHICH MRS. LOUISE

IN RELATION TO THE SUNSET

ALSO THAT MRS. LOUISE BAUGH HAD HAD CONVERSATIONS
FOLLOWING THOSE CONVERSATIONS WITH PENNY,

SHE COULDN'T

SR+, COULDN'T UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF
AND THE COURT FOUND SOME OF THE

6

1

C O N V E R S ^ l (mS

2

WLTh THE OVERALL MKI) I CAJ. F I N D I N G S

3

RELATING TO SOMK

J SS^T>

TO BE

THAT DR.

INCONSISTENT
ABDULIiA HAD

iNDICATKD.

4

ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE

5

PRESENTED EVIDENCE FROM \)R. DANGERFJELD BASED ON

b

TRANSCRIPTS AND OTHERS.

7

THEY WERE ADMITTED, TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE

8

TRANSCRIPTS.

y

THE TRANSCRIPTS TO THE COURT ARE (JUJTE PERSUASIVE THAT TN

0

CONVERSATIONS AND

L

TRANSCRIPTS, AT LEAST AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF

2

MARCH A'l ,

'5

MRS

4

THE CONVERSATIONS AND PARTICULARLY UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE

h

OH THE TRANSACTION AND THE DEED.

h

DEEDED OVER AND THAT THERE WAS A DEED TO THE PROPERTY.

7

ALSO THE COURT RECEIVED TESTIMONY FROM MR. WILLIAM

H

HADE I ELD, THE NEIGHBOR OR HKIhifll) OF OVER

9

WORK ASSOCIATE, GENERAL ROBBINS, WHO HAD BEEN A FRIEND

0

AND ASSOCIATE FOR OVER

i

TRAINING hROIl MRS. LOUISE BAUGH ABOUT BUS J NESS ACTJLVITLES

2

AND BUSINESS VENTURES, WOULD

'*

MRS

4

BUSINESS TRANSACT IONS* AND THAT -- AND THE TESTIMONY Ob

AND

AND WITH THAT THE COURT, BECAUSE

IN REVIEWING THE TRANSCRIPTS, I THINK

IN SUBJECT MATTER,

AND THE TIME WOULD

IN REVIEWING THOSE

INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT

LOUISE BAUGH WAS COMPETENT, UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF

THAT THE DEED HAD BEEN

10 YEARS AND

3() YEARS AND WHO HAD RECEIVED

INDICATE TO THE COURT THAI1

LOMiSh HAUGH HAD A SIGNIFICANT UNDERSTANDING OF

ft \it< . D A N G E R M E L D WITH THE TRANSCRIPTS, THE COURT DOES NOT

7

J

FTN1) ' ^ | T THE PLAINTIFF HAS S U S T / ^ £ D THEIR BURDEN OF

2

CLEAR AND CONVINCING

3

INCOMPETENT ON MARCH 23RD, 1992, WHEN THE DEED WAS

4

EXECUTED.

b

TESTJMONY OF LORLE BROWN WHO INDICATED THAT SHE COULD

6

ANSWKR THE (JUESTIONS, THAT SHE APPEARED COHERENT AND

7

UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

8
9

EVIDENCE THAT MRS. LOUISE BAUGH WAS

AND TH[S JS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN LIGHT OF THE

ON THAT BASIS AS TO THE CLAIM OF WHETHER
MRS. LOUISE BAUGH WAS INCOMPETENT, THE COURT DOES NOT

JO

b'lND THAT THERE HAS BEEN PRESENTED CLEAR AND CONVINCING

li

EVIDENCE TO THIS COURT THAT SHE WAS INCOMPETENT, AND ON

12

THAT DATE.

J3

AND THE COURT WOULD FIND FACTUALLY THAT IT APPEARS THAT

14

LOlirSE BAUGH HAD PERIODS

lb

THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND AND SHE ALSO HAD PERIODS IN

16

WHICH SHE HAD DETERIORATING MEMORY.

17

CASES POINT OUT, 1 THINK CLEARLY, SHE WAS VERY ILL, AND

18

SHE HAD SOME MEMORY LOSS.

19

THINGS, BUT NOT TO THE POINT Ob BEING INCOMPETENT TO

2U

UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS,

21

I THINK THERE WAS A CONFLICT OF THE EVIDENCE

IN WHICH SHE WAS LUCID AND HAD

BUT I THINK AS THE

AND SHE HAD A NUMBER OF

AS TO THE ISSUE Ot% UNDUE INFLUENCE, THE COURT

22

BELIEVES THAT THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN VON HAKE IS

2\

STANDARD THAT REALLY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

24

THAT IS 70b P. 2D 7tftir, UTAH SUPREME COURT 1985.

2b

INDICATED THAT THE LAW

-- ON PAGE 769 SAID

THE
AND

IT

THAT, "THE

8

1

LAW PR^P>MES THAT ONE ORDINARILY l ^ E S

HIS OR HER OWN

2

JUDGMENTS, HOWEVER IMPERFECT, AND ACTS ON THEM;

3

NOT READILY ASSUME THAT ONE'S WILL

4

ANOTHER.

5

THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP.

6

IF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP .IS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN

7

PARTIES, ANY TRANSACTION THAT BENEFITS THE PARTY IN WHOM

8

THE TRUST IS REPOSED XS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN UNFAIR AND

9

TO HAVE RESULTED FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FRAUD."

IT DOES

HAS BEEN OVERBORNE BY

THEREFORE, THE LAW DOES NOT LIGHTLY RECOGNIZE
HOWEVER,

"THE

10

PARTY THEN BEARS THE BURDEN OF PERSUADING THE FACT FINDER

11

BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE TRANSACTION

12

WAS IN FACT FAIR AND NOT THE RESULT OF FRAUD OR UNDUE

13

INFLUENCE.

14

TRANSACTION WILL HE SET ASJDE.

15

THINK

lb

Gl.EED AND PENNY MACKEY HAD A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

17

WITH LOUISE BAUGH.

18

ABOUT THE TESTIMONY THAT THEY BOTH HAD A VERY CLOSE

19

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HER.

20

WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A TRANSACTION, AND I THINK IT WAS

21

RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF ON CLOSING ARGUMENT, THAT THERE

22

MAY BE A STRONG ARGUMENT TO SET ASIDE THE DEED IN 1990 OR

23

THE SAME TYPE OF PRESUMPTION HAD THAT BEEN AN ISSUE IN

24

THE CASE.

2*S

IN THE CASE.

IF THAT BURDEN

IT \S

tS NOT CARRIED, THE
AND IN THIS CASE, I

CLEAR FROM THE STANDARDS THAT BOTH ERNIE

I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION

IN THAT INSTANCE,

I DON'T THINK THAT'S BEFORE US OR NOT AN ISSUE
BUT I THINK WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

9

1

R E L A T ^ S H J P , THE COURT FINDS T H A ^ f H E R E WAS, BASED ON

2

PENNY'S TESTIMONY, BASED ON REALLY EVERYONE'S TESTIMONY,

3

THAT THERE WAS A STRONG CONFIDENTIAL

4

EXLSTING.

5

IS UNFAIR AND WAS A RESULT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE

6

BENK> TTJ NG

7

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THE TRANSACTION WAS FAIR

8

AND NOT THE RESULT OF FRAUD OR UNDUE INFLUENCE.

9

THAT CASE, THE COURT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS A

RELATIONSHIP

AND THEREFORE, THERE'S A PRESUMPTION THAT IT

PARTY THEN HAS THE BURDEN BY THE

10

RESULT OF FRAUD.

11

WAS EVEN ANY ELEMENTS RAISED OF FRAUD.

12

LS NOT ADDRESSING THE FRAUD ELEMENT BECAUSE IT'S NOT.

13

HUT THE niJKSTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE, WAS THERE UNDUE

14

INFLUENCE AND THE NATURE OF THAT.

15

THE COURT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY

J6

ANDERSON VERSUS BRINKERHOFF.

17

CASE DEALT W LTH THE QUEST LON OF (JNDUE INFLUENCE AND

18

STATED

19

AGREE WITH THE TRIAL COURT THAT THERE WAS SUFFTCLENT

20

EVIDENCE THAT ELSTE LACKED THE REQUISITE INTENT TO

21

TRANSFER HER PROPERTY WHEN SHE SIGNED THE 1979 AND 1980

22

CONVEYANCES.

23

INFLUENCE EXERTED UPON HEK BY HER CHILDREN AND

24

GRANDCHLI.nKKN,

25

I'M NOT GOING TO —

AND IN

-- JT SAYS ON PAGE

I DON'T THINK THERE
AND SO THE COURT

AND IN THAT REGARD,

INTERESTED IN THE CASE OF

THE ISSUE RAISED IN THAT

IOC) IN TALKING, IT SAYS, "WE

SHE SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS AS A RESULT OF

IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO PLEASE THEM."

"WHEN THE DEED IS EXECUTED WITH NO INTENT TO

10

3

/TRAAIsflR PRESENT INTEREST PROPER'lW IT IS INVALID."

2

"COURTS HAVE CONSEQUENTLY HELD THAT A CONVEYANCE IS

3

VALID ONLY UPON UPON DELIVERY OK A DEED WITH PRESENT

4

INTEREST TO TRANSFER.

5

DELIVERY AND IS OF PRIMARY AND CONTROLLING

6

"THE GRANTOR'S PRESENT INTENT MUST BE TO PASS HIS OR HER

7

TITLE INTEREST TO THE GRANTEE AND DIVEST HIMSELF OF THE

8

SAME, OTHERWLSE THE PURPORTED DEED JS NOT VALID OR

9

EFFECTIVE."

INTENTION IS THE ESSENCE OF
IMPORTANCE.

AND JT WENT ON TO INDICATE IN THAT CASE r

IT

JO

SAYS, "THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE EXECUTION OF THE DEEDS

Jl

JN 1979 AND

12

JNTENT TO TRANSFER PROPERTY."

n

1980 INDICATE THAT ELSIE LACKED THE NECESSARY

IN THIS CASE, THE COURT WOULD FIND THE

14

FOLLOWING h ACTS

IN RELATION TO THE INTENT.

I THINK IT

15

HAS HEECJ THE TESTIMONY

lb

LOUISE HAUGH HOTH TO THE

17

ALSO TO THE 1992 TRANSFER WAS TO CONVEY HER HOME UPON HER

18

DEATH.

I9

TRANSCRIPTS OF THE TESTIMONY THAT WERE TAKEN ON MARCH 27

20

AND JUNE

2\

tlUSHANl) HOB,

:>..>

CONVERSATIONS AND THE

23

TRANSFER

24

PENNY TO HAVE THE HOME WHEN SHE J) IED.

25

INTENT WHEN THEY WERE TRANSFERRED TO ERNIE GLEED WAS THAT

IN THIS CASE THAT THE INTENT OF
1990 TRANSFER AND I TH TNK BUT

1 THINK THE TESTIMONY, PARTICULARLY THE

3RD, TESTIMONY OF PENNY, TESTLMONY OF HER
IN THIS CASE, INDICATED THAT THE
INTENT OF MRS. LOUISE BAUOH WAS TO

THE HOME TO PENNY AT HER DEATH.

THAT SHE WANTED
I THINK THE

13

1

HE W(^P,D HAVE -- I THTNK THERE \JW THE INTENT TO CLEARLY

2

THE

3

HE I.TVED IN IT AND THAT WAS HTS HOME.

4

HOME,

5

f THINK THAT WAS CLEARLY THE INTENTION.

6

SHE EVER WAVERED FROM THAT.

7

AND READING ALL THE TESTCMONY,

8

HAUGH WANTED TO DO IS DEAL WITH THIS AS TESTAMENTARY

9

FASHION UPON HER DEATH.

INTENT TO TRANSFER THE HOME HE LIVED IN AT THE TIME
BUT AS TO HER

L THINK THE INTENT WAS TO TRANSFER

IT AT HER DEATH.
I DON'T THINK

IN READING THE TRANSCRIPTS
THAT WAS WHAT LOUISE

AND TN THAT REGARD, IN THE UTAH

10

CASE BAKER VERSUS PATTEE AT 684 P.2D 632, AND IT STATES

11

]N THAT CASE AND IN A SIMJLAR CASE WHERE THEY DEALT WITH

12

WHAT APPEARS TO A DEED WHEN THE INTENT WAS TO TRANSFER

II

INTEREST AT DEATH AND WHEN YOU WANT TO MAINTAIN AN

14

INTEREST

\b

THAT ON PAGE 614, "PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT THE DEED WAS

16

NOT DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED WTTH THE REQUISITE LEGAL

17

INTENT, AND THAT AT BEST IT MUST BE VIEWED TO BE A

18

CONVEYANCE TN TRUST."

19

BEING TRANSFERRED

20

IS EXECUTED WITH NO INTENT TO TRANSFER A PRESENT

21

INTEREST, IT WILL BE INVALIDATED BY A COURT TN EQUITY.

22

THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT A CONVEYANCE

2 "5

DELIVERY OK A DEED WITH PRESENT INTENT TO TRANSFER."

24

THEN THE COURT C [M'FTS WTTH APPROVAL A COLORADO CASE,

?.*>

CIIRTISS VERSUS FERRTS.

IN THE PROPERTY DURING YOUR LTFE.

THAT WAS FUTURE

IN THAT CASE.

AND

AN

fNDICATES

LNTEREST THAT'S

IT SAID, "WHERE A DEED

rs VALID ONLY UPON

AND I THTNK THE CURTTSS VERSUS

12

AND

1

EERR1S W i S E

iS VERY SIMILAR TO T H E ^ A S E THAT WE'RE

2

DEALING WITH

1

4Sf> P.2D 38.

4

A MOTHER

5

ASIDE A DEED THAT SHE SJGNED

6

MOTHKK TO THE GRANDDAUGHTKK

7

TO LIVE IN DURING HER LIFE.

8

TRANSFER

9

THAI' CASE, THE COLORADO CASE WHICH HAS BEEN CITED BY

IN THIS CASE AND IT WAS A COLORADO CASE AT
AND IN THAT CASE, THERE WAS A GRANDMOTHER,

AND A DAUGHTER AND THE MOTHER —

fT AT HER DEATH.

GRANDMOTHER

SET

LN JOINT TENANCY FROM THE
JN THE HOME THAT WAS HER HOME
AND HER INTENT WAS TO

THAT WAS THE INTENT.

AND IN

10

AUTHORITY IN UTAH, THE COLORADO LAW SET ASIDE THE

11

CONVEYANCE AND TRUST IN THE CASE.

12

IN COLORADO WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED IN UTAH THAT, "AN

]1

INTENT TO PASS A PRESENT INTEREST IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

14

IN DELIVERY OF PROPERTY.

15

KSTABLJSUES THAT ONE DOES NOT INTEND TO PASS SUCH A

16

PRESENT INTEREST JN PROPERTY THAT AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES,

17

THERE'S NO B1NDJNG DELIVERY EVEN THOUGH THE DEED IS

18

RECORDED."

IS

A DEED TO HE OPERATIVE ONLY OH THE GRANTOR'S DEATH, THE

JO

GRANTOR MAY HAVE THE DEED SET ASIDE AS TO THE GRANTEE."

J I

"ANOTHER RULE OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE IS THAT

22

PRIME FACIE EVIDENCE OF DELIVERY THAT ARISES FROM

2\

RECORDING MAYBE REBUTTED BY EVIDENCE SHOWING A LACK OF

,M

INTENT TO TRANSFER A~*"PRESKNT INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY."

?.S

THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE EVIDENCE

BUT IT SAID IN THE LAW

AND WHEN "THE EVIDENCE

"IT IS ALSO THE RULE OF LAW WHEN ONE

INTENDS

IN THIS CASE, BASED

13

1

ON TH^J/ESTIMONY OF ALL OK THE P^TlES, BOTH PLAINTIFF

2

ANJ) DEFENDANT, WOULD CONVEY THAT THE INTEREST TO BE

3

TRANSFERRED IN LOUISE BAUGH'S HOME WAS NOT A PRESENT

4

INTEREST BUT WAS A FUTURE INTEREST.

5

COURT WOULD FIND PURSUANT TO THE CASE LAW THAT THE

6

TRANSFER AND CONVEYANCE OF MARCH 23RD, 1992, SHOULD BE

7

SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE TNTENT OF LOUISE BAUGH

8

TO TRANSFER A PRESENT INTEREST IN HER HOME.

9

THE DEEDS ARE NOT VALID AS TO THE HOME.

10

NOW, THE ISSUE THAT —

AND AS SUCH, THE

AND AS SUCH,

AND I'M NOT SURE WHERE

11

TO DEAL WITH BEFORE THE COURT BUT BASED ON THE

12

EVIDENCE,

-

AND I'M NOT EVEN SURE IT'S AN TSSUE.

MAYBE

1 ** WE DEAL WITH IT FURTHER, BUT 1 THINK THE SAME FACTUAL
14

SITUATION

MIGHT APPLY TO THE 1990 DEED; NOT TO THE HOME

15

THAT MR. GLEED LIVES \U,

16

BECAUSE I THLNK THE TESTJMONY BEFORE THE COURT IN THAT

17

CASE ALSO WAS THAT SHE INTENDED TO HAVE A LIFE INTEREST

18

IN THE HOME AND IN THAT CASE IT MAY BE THAT CONVEYANCE

19

ALSO IS NOT A VALID CONVEYANCE WHICH WOULD —

20

WOULD REMAIN

21

THAT WOULD HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE ESTATE.

22

EVIDENCE —- AND I'M NOT SURE I'M SETTING AS A COURT OF

23

EQUITY AND MAYBE YOU PARTIES WOULD WANT TO ADDRESS THAT

24

OR HAVE FURTHER HN>KKI NO OU HERE.

2*S

THAT THE COURT HAS SEEN, AND CONCLUSIONS THAT I'VE

BUT TO MRS. LOUISE BAUGH*S HOME

TN MRS. LOUISE BAUGH'S

THE DEED

AND BE SOMETHING
GIVEN THE

BUT GIVEN THE FACTS

14

1
1 2

REACHKi^Pl THTNK THAT'S A FAIRLY I J W A L CONCLUSION BASED
ON THE LAW THAT'S IN THE STATE OF UTAH.

WITH THAT I

3

GUESS,

4

WITH THAT THEN, THE COURT WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR

5

OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO SET ASTDE THE DEED, THE MARCH 22ND

6

DEED, BUT IN THAT REGARD, IF

7

COURT AS JUST AS TO THE LOUISE BAUGH HOME, THE

8

WOULD ALSO SET ASIDE THE 1990 DEED UNDER THE SAME

9

RATIONALE AND SET OF FACTS; THE STATE OF MIND OF MRS.

—

AND WITH THAT ARE THERE QUESTIONS?

I THINK

.IT JS PROPERLY BEFORE THE

10

LOUISE BAUGH AS TO HER INTENT WHEN SHE MADE THAT

U

TRANSFER.

J2

MR. PATTERSON:

L3

THE COURT:

YOU ARE ORDERING THAT TOO.

WELL, 1 DON'T KNOW IF I HAVE THE

14

AUTHORITY TO DO THAT FOR THAT BEFORE THE COURT.

L5

SITTING AS A COURT OF EQUITY WHICH IS —

16

WOULD RESEARCH

17
18

I'M

AND I PROBABLY

TT AND L DON'T KNOW.

MK. PATTERSON:

WOULD THAT NOT BE AN LSSUE THAT

THE HEIRS WOULD RAISE SAYING THAT

19

COURT

THE COURT:

JT MAY BE.

—
IT MAY BE OUTSIDE THE

20

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT BECAUSE THAT CONVEYANCE IS NOT

21

DLRECTLY BEFORE THE COURT.

22

MRS. MALMBERG:

23

A S I D E HER

24

OTHER

25

CONVEYANCE

I THINK THAT THE COURT SETTING

IT HAS TO L O G I C A L L Y

SET ASH)E

THE

ONE TOO.

THE COURT:

WELL, IF I HAVE JURISDICTION TO DO

15

r

1

THAT. P A M NOT SURE THAT 1 HAVE

M [ JURISDICTION

SITTING

2

AS A COURT OF EQUITY TO DO THAT.

3

ISSUE THAT NEEDS TO BE BRIEFED AND I NEED TO FURTHER RULE

4

SUBSEQUENT TO THIS.

5

SLTDATI ON THAT I HAVE FOUND AS TO HER INTENT AND WHAT THE

6

CONVEYANCES WERE AS TO HER HOME, AND W[TH THAT,

7

LTKE TO MAKE JUST SO THE RECORD IS CLEAR.

8

EVTDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED TO THE COURT THE MONEY PAID, THE

9

CHECKS AND HISTORY THAT THE HOME THAT PENNY MACKEY LIVES

SO MAYBE THAT'S AN

GIVEN THE FACTS, AND THE FACT

I WOULD

I THINK THE

10

IN NOW WAS THE HOME THAT WAS INTENDED TO BE PURCHASED AND

J L

WAS PURCHASED BY HER AND WAS NOT A GIFT.

J2

FOR THAT HOME.

I*i

ALSO THE HOME THAT MR. ERNEST GLEED IS IN WAS INTENDED TO

14

BE GIVEN TO HIM.

15

CLEAR, FULL INTENT THAT THAT HOME BE HIS HOME AND NO

16

QUESTIONS 3WITH THE EVIDENCE.

17

ABOUT IS HER HOME AND WHAT HER INTENT WAS.

18

CLEARLY HER INTENT THROUGHOUT THIS WAS THAT SHE MAINTAIN

19

A LIFE INTEREST AND IT BE HER HOME DURING HER LIFE.

20

CONVEYED

21

SHE HAVE IT FOR A LIFETIME AND UPON DEATH ERNIE WOULD

22

HAVE IT.

21

THAT TIME WAS TO —

24

INTEND TO CONVEY

25

INTEREST AND SHE CONVEY

RECEIVED

IT.

SHE HAS PAID

AND IT'S NOT CONSIDERED.

THAT HE HAD THAT HOME AND IT WAS THE

IT ORIGINALLY TO KRN1K

THE ONLY ONE I'M TALKING
AND I THINK

SHE

THE INTENT WAS IS THAT

AND WHEN SHE CHANGED ERNIE'S NAME HER INTENT AT
AND I THINK WHEN SHE DID IT SHE

IT*"" THAT SHE MAINTAINED A LIFE
IT TO PENNY AFTER HER DEATH.

16

AND

1. BOTHfP THOSE INSTANCES, BASED dWrHE
2

LAW, I THINK THAT

THAT IS NOT A VALID CONVEYANCE.

3

MR. PATTERSON:

MAY WE BRIEF THAT.

MY

4

CONSIDERATION ON THAT SCORE IS THAT, YOU KNOW, NUMBER

5

ONE, IS FENNY MACKEY A PERSON WITH STANDING TO ALLEGE

6

THAT.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. PATTERSON:

9

THAT'S CORRECT.

AND THAT MAY BE.

NUMBER TWO, IF SHE IS NOT, THEN

IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A —

WE CERTAINLY KNOW THAT THE

10

HEIRS ARE.

11

ASSIGNED TO JUDGE PAGE.

12

FLNDINGS THAT YOU ARE MAKING WOULD APPLY ON A COLLATERAL

13

ESTOPPEL -— YOU KNOW, I'M JUST, YOU KNOW, BLATHERING A

14

LITTLE -- BUT WOULD HAVE A COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT ON

15

MR. Gi.KKI) BECAUSE HE'S HA]) FULL OPPORTUNITY, YOU KNOW, TO

1.6

WHAT, APPEAR, DEFEND AND CROSS EXAMINE OR WHATEVER.

17

WOULD THEN MEAN THAT SHOULD THE MERITS OR ANY ONE OF THE

'18

HEIRS CHOOSE TO CHALLENGE, THAT THAT DETERMINATION THAT

19

THEY WOULD DO SO TYPICALLY WITHIN A PROBATE PROCEEDING,

20

WOULD THEY NOT.

21

AND THERE'S A PENDING PROBATE THAT HAS BEEN

THE COURT:

IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE

THAT

AND J THINK THAT PROBABLY IS THE

22

CASE.

23

PENNY HAS THE STANDING BECAUSE 1 DON'T THINK SHE INHERITS

24

THROUGH THE ESTATE?"

25

BECAUSE 1 DON'T THINK WITH THE OTHER HEIRS THAT

MR. PATTERSON:

THROUGH HER LIVING MOTHER.

17

NO,

1

I W O U ^ h ' T THINK SO.

2

THK COURT:

MY THOUGHT W s

I LOOK AT IT

—

WELL, I WOULD GIVE EITHER PARTY,

3

IF THEY WANTED TO BRIEF THK ISSUE.

4

I THINK

5

PROBATE.

BUT IT IS PROPERLY

—

IT WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE HANDLED AT

6

MR. PATTERSON:

I DON'T KNOW HOW TO SPELL

7

PROBATE.

MY LAW PARTNER DOES.

AND I WOULD BRIEF THAT IF

8

IT IS RELEVANT TO YOUR HONOR.

9

WOULD BE BECAUSE IF I THINK MY INSTINCTS SAY THIS WOULD

YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT

10

BE A MATTER THAT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD THEN

11

SAY, BUT THERE ARE ASSETS THAT THIS ESTATE BECAUSE OF

12

JUDGE MEMMOTT'S RULING WILL NOW CLAIM THAT PREVIOUSLY ON

13

JOINT TENANCY DEED WE DID NOT UNDER SURVIVORSHIP RULES

14

OUTSIDE OK PROBATE.

15

PUTTING US BACK

16

DOING THAT.

17

THEREFORE, JUDGE MEMMOTT'S RULING IS

INTO THE ESTATE OR HAS THE EFFECT OF

THE COURT:

I. THINK THAT WOULD PROBABLY BE THE

18

CASE.

THK DEED THEY TRANSFERRED —

19

HAD TRANSFERRED THAT ORIGINAL DEED WAS PROBABLY IT WASN'T

20

A DEED THAT WAS PROPERLY AT THAT TIME IN ERNIE'S NAME.

21

WHY DON'T

22

GIVE YOU

23

JUST, MR. PATTERSON, ASK YOU TO PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACT

24

AND CONCLUSIONS OK IfTAW CONSISTENT WITH THIS. ANY OTHER

25

OUESTIONS OR

I GIVE —
'to DAYS.

L MEAN BECAUSE THEY

IF YOU --- I WOULD ALLOW —

I WOULD

UF THERE'S NOTHING FILED THEN WE'LL

ISSUES BEKORK THE COURT.

THE COURT THEN

18

1

2

WILl, t ^ ) N

RKC.'KSS.

( CONCLUDED AT 11:40

)

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
J4
1.5
16
1.7
18
19
20
21
*»

«_i

23

24
25

19
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lished by the donor but it will usually be
the case that, as noted in Loch v. Mayer, 50
Misc. 442, 448, 100 N.Y.S. 837, dealing with
a disaster relief fund solicited by a church,
'Tflew donations were accompanied with
writings of any kind, and no such writing,
so far as the evidence shows, states with
any attempt at precision the terms of the
trust." As to any contribution found to
have been made for a restricted purpose, it
will also be of importance whether it has
been fully expended.

68 N.Y.2d 48
Michael S. GRUEN, Respondent,
v.
Kemija GRUEN, Appellant.
Court of Appeals of New York.
July 8, 1986.

Son brought action seeking declaration
that he was righful owner of a painting in
Relevant also, as already noted, will be his stepmother's possession. Son alleged
the activities of the corporation in fact car- that his deceased father made a valid gift
ried out under its charter, and to a lesser of the painting to him while reserving a life
extent the corporate purposes stated in the estate. The Supreme Court, Kings County,
charter. Specifically, in terms of the Levine, J., entered judgment in favor of
present case has the emphasis of MSSO as stepmother, and son appealed. The Sushown by its creation and its activities been preme Court, Appellate Division, 104
on the disease or on service? Both are A.D.2d 171, 488 N.Y.S.2d 401, reversed,
specifically mentioned in its name and both and stepmother appealed. The Court of
are referred to in the statement of its pur- Appeals, Simons, J., held that* (1) a valid
poses contained in its amended certificate inter vivos gift of a chattel may be made
where donor reserves a life estate in chatof incorporation.
tel and donee never has physical possession
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of it before donor's death; (2) evidence
appealed from and the order of the Appel- established that father intended to transfer
late Division brought up for review should ownership of painting to son while retainbe reversed, with costs to appellants, and ing a life estate in it; and (3) letters from
the matter remitted to Supreme Court, father to son referring to gift were suffiKings County, for further proceedings in cient to satisfy delivery requirement.
accordance with this opinion.
Affirmed.
WACHTLER, C J., and SIMONS, KAYE,
ALEXANDER and HANCOCK, JJ., concur.
TITONE, J., taking no part.
Judgment appealed from and order of
the Appellate Division brought up for review reversed, etc.

(O

| KEY NUMBCR SYSTEM^

1. Gifts e=>ll, 18(1)
A valid inter vivos gift of a chattel
may be made where the donor has reserved
a life estate in the chattel and donee never
has physical possession of it before donor's
death.
2. Gifts «=>4
To make a valid inter vivos gift there
must exist* intent on part of donor to make
a present transfer; delivery of the gift,
either actual or constructive to donee; and
acceptance by donee.
3. Gifts «=»49(1)
Proponent of a gift has burden of
proving elements of a gift by clear and
convincing evidence.
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4. Gifts <s=>15
An inter vivos gift requires that the
donor intend to make an irrevocable
present transfer of ownership; if the intention is to make a testamentary disposition
effective only after death, the gift is invalid
unless made by will.
5. Gifts <s=>49(l)
Evidence, including letters from father
to son, supported conclusion that father
intended to transfer ownership of painting
to son in 1963 but to retain a life estate in
it and that he did effectively transfer a
remainder interest in the painting to his
son at that time; moreover, that father
retained possession of the painting, insured
it, allowed others to exhibit it and made
necessary repairs to it was not inconsistent
with his retention of a life estate.
6. Gifts <£=>4
In determining whether there has been
a valid inter vivos gift of a remainder interest following a life estate, test is whether
donor intended gift to have no effect until
after his death, or whether he intended to
transfer some present interest; as long as
the evidence establishes an intent to make
a present and irrevocable transfer of title
or the right of ownership, there is a
present transfer of some interest and the
gift is effective immediately.
7. Gifts <s=>18(2)
In order to have a valid inter vivos
gift, there must be a delivery of the gift,
either by physical delivery of the subject of
the gift or a constructive or symbolic delivery such as by an instrument of gift, sufficient to divest the donor of dominion and
control over the property.
8. Gifts <s=18(l)
Delivery requirement of an inter vivos
gift is not rigid or inflexible, but is to be
applied in light of its purpose to avoid
mistakes by donors and fraudulent claims
by donees, and thus what is sufficient to
constitute delivery must be tailored to suit
circumstances of the case.

9. Gifts <s=>23
Letters from father to son which unambiguously established that father intended to make a present gift to son of title to
painting while father retained a life estate
were sufficient instruments of gift to satisfy delivery requirement; father was not
required to part with possession of the
painting when possession is exactly what
he intended to retain.
10. Gifts <s=>23
A donor making a gift of a remainder
interest in a chattel following a life estate
is not required, to satisfy delivery requirement of a gift, to physically deliver the
chattel into the donee's hands with donee
redelivering the chattel to the donor.
11. Gifts <&=>24, 47(2)
Acceptance by a donee is essential to
validity of an inter vivos gift, but when a
gift is of value to the donee, law will presume an acceptance.
12. Gifts <&=>49(3)
Son presented clear and convincing
proof of his acceptance of a remainder interest given by his father in painting by
evidence that he made several contemporaneous statements acknowledging the gift
to his friends and associates, even showing
some of them his father's gift letter, and
that he had retained both letters for over
17 years to verify gift after his father died;
moreover, fact that son failed to list interest in painting as an asset in affidavit filed
in matrimonial action over ten years after
acceptance did not overcome substantial
showing of acceptance.
Paul G. Whitby and Helen J. Williamson,
New York City, for appellant
Michael S. Gruen, pro se.
Victor P. Muskin, New York City, for
Michael S. Gruen, respondent
OPINION OF THE COURT
SIMONS, Judge.
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking
a declaration that he is the rightful owner
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a painting which he alleges his father,
deceased, gave to him. He concedes
that he has never had possession of the
painting but asserts that his father made a
n0w

valid gift of the title in 1963 reserving a
life estate for himself. His father retained
possession of the painting until he died in
1980. Defendant, plaintiffs stepmother,
has the painting now and has refused plaintiffs requests that she turn it over to him.
She contends that the purported gift was
testamentary in nature and invalid insofar
as the formalities of a will were not met or,
alternatively, that a donor may not make a
valid inter vivos gift of a chattel and retain
a life estate with a complete right of possession. Following a seven-day nonjury trial, Special Term found that plaintiff had
failed to establish any of the elements of
an inter vivos gift and that in any event an
attempt by a donor to retain a present
possessory life estate in a chattel invalidated a purported gift of it. The Appellate
Division held that a valid gift may be made
reserving a life estate and, finding the elements of a gift established in this case, it
reversed and remitted the matter for a
determination of value (104 A.D.2d 171, 488
N.Y.S.2d 401). That determination has
now been made and defendant appeals directly to this court, pursuant to CPLR
5601(d), from the subsequent final judgment entered in Supreme Court awarding
plaintiff $2,500,000 in damages representing the value of the painting, plus interest.
We now affirm.
The subject of the dispute is a work
entitled "Schloss Kammer am Attersee II"
painted by a noted Austrian modernist,
Gustav Klimt. It was purchased by plaintiffs father, Victor Gruen, in 1959 for
*8>000. On April 1,1963 the elder Gruen, a
successful architect with offices and residences in both New York City and Los
Angeles during most of the time involved
*n this action, wrote a letter to plaintiff,
th
*n an undergraduate student at Harvard,
stating that he was giving him the Klimt
Panting for his birthday but that he
Joshed to retain the possession of it for his
lfe
time. This letter is not in evidence,
Pparently because plaintiff destroyed it on

instructions from his father. Two other
letters were received, however, one dated
May 22, 1963 and the other April 1, 1963.
Both had been dictated by Victor Gruen
and sent together to plaintiff on or about
May 22, 1963. The letter dated May 22,
1963 reads as follows:
"Dear Michael:
"I wrote you at the time of your birthday
about the gift of the painting by Klimt.
"Now my lawyer tells me that because of
the existing tax laws, it was wrong to
mention in that letter that I want to use
the painting as long as I live. Though I
still want to use it, this should not appear
in the letter. I am enclosing, therefore,
a new letter and I ask you to send the old
one back to me so that it can be destroyed.
"I know this is all very silly, but the
lawyer and our accountant insist that
they must have in their possession copies
of a letter which will serve the purpose
of making it possible for you, once I die,
to get this picture without having to pay
inheritance taxes on it.
"Love,
"s/Victor".
Enclosed with this letter was a substitute
gift letter, dated April 1, 1963, which stated:
"Dear Michael:
"The 21st birthday, being an important
event in life, should be celebrated accordingly. I therefore wish to give you as a
present the oil painting by Gustav Klimt
of Schloss Kammer which now hangs in
the New York living room. You know
that Lazette and I bought it some 5 or 6
years ago, and you always told us how
much you liked it.
"Happy birthday again.
"Love,
"s/Victor".
Plaintiff never took possession of the painting nor did he seek to do so. Except for a
brief period between 1964 and 1965 when it
was on loan to art exhibits and when restoration work was performed on it, the painting remained in his father's possession,
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moving with him from New York City to
Beverly Hills and finally to Vienna, Austria, where Victor Gruen died on February
14, 1980. Following Victor's death plaintiff
requested possession of the Klimt painting
and when defendant refused, he commenced this action.
[1-3] The issues framed for appeal are
whether a valid inter vivos gift of a chattel
may be made where the donor has reserved
a life estate in the chattel and the donee
never has had physical possession of it
before the donor's death and, if it may,
which factual findings on the elements of a
valid inter vivos gift more nearly comport
with the weight of the evidence in this
case, those of Special Term or those of the
Appellate Division. The latter issue requires application of two general rules.
First, to make a valid inter vivos gift there
must exist the intent on the part of the
donor to make a present transfer; delivery
of the gift, either actual or constructive to
the donee; and acceptance by the donee
(Matter of Szabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 98, 217
N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395; Matter of
Kelly, 285 N.Y. 139, 150, 33 N.E.2d 62
[dissenting in part opn]; Matter of Van
Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 306, 100 N.E. 802;
Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 428, 22
N.E. 940). Second, the proponent of a gift
has the burden of proving each of these
elements by clear and convincing evidence
(Matter of Kelley, supra, 285 N.Y. at p.
150, 33 N.E.2d 62; Matter of Abramottritz,
38 A.D.2d 387, 389-390, 329 N.Y.S.2d 932,
affd on opn. 32 N.Y.2d 654, 342 N.Y.S.2d
855, 295 N.E.2d 654).
Donative Intent
[4] There is an important distinction between the intent with which an inter vivos
gift is made and the intent to make a gift
by will. An inter vivos gift requires that
the donor intend to make an irrevocable
present transfer of ownership; if the intention is to make a testamentary disposition
effective only after death, the gift is invalid
unless made by will (see, McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 409, 24 N.E.2d 102; Gan-

non v. McGuire, 160 N.Y. 476, 481, 55 N.E
7; Martin v. Funk, 75 N.Y. 134, 137-i3g)
[5] Defendant contends that the trial
court was correct in finding that Victor did
not intend to transfer any present interest
in the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but only
expressed an intention that plaintiff was to
get the painting upon his death. The evidence is all but conclusive, however, that
Victor intended to transfer ownership of
the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but to
retain a life estate in it and that he did,
therefore, effectively transfer a remainder
interest in the painting to plaintiff at that
time. Although the original letter was not
in evidence, testimony of its contents was
received along with the substitute gift letter and its covering letter dated May 22,
1963. The three letters should be considered together as a single instrument
(see, Matter of Brandreth, 169 N.Y. 437,
440, 62 N.E. 563) and when they are they
unambiguously establish that Victor Gruen
intended to make a present gift of title to
the painting at that time. But there was
other evidence for after 1963 Victor made
several statements orally and in writing
indicating that he had previously given
plaintiff the painting and that plaintiff
owned it. Victor Gruen retained possession of the property, insured it, allowed
others to exhibit it and made necessary
repairs to it but those acts are not inconsistent with his retention of a life estate.
Furthermore, whatever probative value
could be attached to his statement that he
had bequeathed the painting to his heirs,
made 16 years later when he prepared an
export license application so that he coul
take the painting out of Austria, is negated
by the overwhelming evidence that he intended a present transfer of title in 19«Victor's failure to file a gift tax return on
the transaction was partially explained t>>
allegedly erroneous legal advice he i£
ceived, and while that omission sometirn
may indicate that the donor had no m ^
tion of making a present gift, it d o e s ^ ^
necessarily do so and it is not dispositiv
this case.
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pefendant contends that even if a Pascal, 10 N.Y.2d 313, 318, 222 N.Y.S.2d
present gift was intended, Victor's reserva- 324, 178 N.E.2d 723, supra; McCarthy v.
tion of a lifetime interest in the painting Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 409-411, 24 N.E.2d
defeated it. She relies on a statement from 102, supra; Matter of Brandreth, 169
Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422 that " '[a]ny N.Y. 437, 442, 62 N.E. 563, supra). Insogift of chattels which expressly reserves far as some of our cases purport to require
the use of the property to the donor for a that the donor intend to transfer both title
certain period, or * * * as long as the and possession immediately to have a valid
donor shall live, is ineffectual*" (id., at p. inter vivos gift (see, Gannon v. McGuire,
436, quoting 2 Schouler, Personal Property, 160 N.Y. 476, 481, 55 N.E. 7, supra;
at 118). The statement was dictum, how- Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422, 430, supra),
ever, and the holding of the court was they state the rule too broadly and confuse
limited to a determination that an attempt- the effectiveness of a gift with the transfer
ed gift of bonds in which the donor re- of the possession of the subject of that gift.
served the interest for life failed because The correct test is "'whether the maker
there had been no delivery of the gift, intended the [gift] to have no effect until
either actual or constructive {see, id., at p. after the maker's death, or whether he
434; see also, Speelman v. Pascal, 10 intended it to transfer some present interN.Y.2d 313, 319-320, 222 N.Y.S.2d 324, 178 est'" (McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407,
N.E.2d 723). The court expressly left 409, 24 N.E.2d 102, supra [emphasis addundecided the question "whether a remain- ed]; see also, 25 N.YJur., Gifts, § 14, at
der in a chattel may be created and given 156-157). As long as the evidence estabby a donor by carving out a life estate for lishes an intent to make a present and
himself and transferring the remainder" irrevocable transfer of title or the right of
(Young v. Young, supra, at p. 440). We ownership, there is a present transfer of
answered part of that question in Matter of
some interest and the gift is effective imBrandreth, 169 N.Y. 437, 441-442, 62 N.E.
mediately (see, Matter of Brady, 228 App.
563, supra) when we held that "[in] this
state a life estate and remainder can be Div. 56, 60, 239 N.Y.S. 5, affd. no opn. 254
created in a chattel or a fund the same as N.Y. 590, 173 N.E. 879; In re Sussman's
in real property". The case did not require Estate, 125 N.Y.S.2d 584, 589-591, affd no
us to decide whether there could be a valid opn. 283 App.Div. 1051, 134 N.Y.S.2d 586,
Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 486, 489,
gift of the remainder.
204 N.Y.S. 284; Brown, Personal Property
[6] Defendant recognizes that a valid § 48, at 133-136 [2d ed]; 25 N.YJur.,
inter vivos gift of a remainder interest can Gifts, § 30, at 173-174; see also, Farmers'
be made not only of real property but also Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y.
of such intangibles as stocks and bonds. 477, 485-486, 144 N.E. 686). Thus, in
Indeed, several of the cases she cites so Speelman v. Pascal (supra), we held valid
hold. That being so, it is difficult to per- a gift of a percentage of the future royalceive any legal basis for the distinction she ties to the play "My Fair Lady" before the
^ges which would permit gifts of remain- play even existed. There, as in this case,
der interests in those properties but not of
the donee received title or the right of
remainder interests in chattels such as the
ownership to some property immediately
Klimt painting here. The only reason sugupon the making of the gift but possession
gested is that the gift of a chattel must
or
enjoyment of the subject of the gift was
delude a present right to possession. The
postponed
to some future time.
application of Brandreth to permit a gift
°f the remainder in this case, however, is
insistent with the distinction, well recogni2
ed in the law of gifts as well as in real
Property law, between ownership and possession or enjoyment (see, Speelman v.

Defendant suggests that allowing a donor to make a present gift of a remainder
with the reservation of a life estate will
lead courts to effectuate otherwise invalid
testamentary dispositions of property. The
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two have entirely different characteristics,
however, which make them distinguishable.
Once the gift is made it is irrevocable and
the donor is limited to the rights of a life
tenant not an owner. Moreover, with the
gift of a remainder title vests immediately
in the donee and any possession is postponed until the donor's death whereas under a will neither title nor possession vests
immediately. Finally, the postponement of
enjoyment of the gift is produced by the
express terms of the gift not by the nature
of the instrument as it is with a will (see,
Robb v. Washington & Jefferson Coll, 185
N.Y. 485, 493, 78 N.E. 359).
Delivery

Rix, 248 N.Y. 76, 83, 161 N.E. 425; Matter
of Van Alstyne, supra, 207 N.Y. at p. 309,
100 N.E. 802: see, Beaver v. Beaver, supra, 117 N.Y. at p. 428, 22 N.E. 940).
[9] Defendant contends that when a
tangible piece of personal property such as
a painting is the subject of a gift, physical
delivery of the painting itself is the best
form of delivery and should be required.
Here, of course, we have only delivery of
Victor Gruen's letters which serve as instruments of gift. Defendant's statement
of the rule as applied may be generally
true, but it ignores the fact that what
Victor Gruen gave plaintiff was not all
rights to the Klimt painting, but only title
to it with no right of possession until his
death. Under these circumstances, it
would be illogical for the law to require the
donor to part with possession of the painting when that is exactly what he intends to
retain.

[7,8] In order to have a valid inter vivos gift, there must be a delivery of the
gift, either by a physical delivery of the
subject of the gift or a constructive or
symbolic delivery such as by an instrument
of gift, sufficient to divest the donor of
dominion and control over the property
[10] Nor is there any reason to require
(see, Matter ofSzabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 98-99,
a donor making a gift of a remainder inter217 N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395, supra;
est in a chattel to physically deliver the
Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y.2d 313, 318chattel into the donee's hands only to have
320, 222 N.Y.S.2d 324, supra; Beaver v.
the donee redeliver it to the donor. As the
Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 428-429, 22 N.E.
facts of this case demonstrate, such a re
940, supra; Matter of Cohn, 187 App.Div.
quirement could impose practical burdens
392, 395, 176 N.Y.S.2d 225). As the stateon the parties to the gift while serving the
ment of the rule suggests, the requirement
delivery requirement poorly. Thus, in orof delivery is not rigid or inflexible, but is
der to accomplish this type of delivery the
to be applied in light of its purpose to avoid
parties would have been required to travel
mistakes by donors and fraudulent claims
to New York for the symbolic transfer and
by donees (see, Matter of Van Alstyne, 207
N.Y. 298, 308,100 N.E. 802, supra; Matter redelivery of the Klimt painting which was
of Cohn, supra, 187 App.Div. at pp. 395- hanging on the wall of Victor Gruen's Man396, 176 N.Y.S.2d 255; Mechem, Require- hattan apartment. Defendant suggests
ment of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and that such a requirement would be stronger
of Choses in Actions Evidenced by Com- evidence of a completed gift, but in the
mercial Instruments, 21 Ill.L.Rev. 341, absence of witnesses to the event or any
348-349). Accordingly, what is sufficient written confirmation of the gift it would
to constitute delivery "must be tailored to provide less protection agamst fraudulent
suit the circumstances of the case" (Matter claims than have the written instruments
of Szabo, supra, 10 N.Y.2d at p. 98, 217 of gift delivered in this case.
N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395). The rule
Acceptance
requires that " *[t]he delivery necessary to
[11,12] Acceptance by the donee is esconsummate a gift must be as perfect as
the nature of the property and the circum- sential to the validity of an inter vivos gift
stances and surroundings of the parties but when a gift is of value to the donee, as
will reasonably permit*" (id.; Vincent v. it is here, the law will presume an accep *
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ance on his part (Matter of Kelsey, 26
N.Y.2d 792, 309 N.Y.S.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
663, affg. on opn. at 29 A.D.2d 450, 456,
289 N.Y.S.2d 314; Beaver v. Beaver, 117
N.Y. 421, 429, 22 N.E. 940, supra). Plaintiff did not rely on this presumption alone
but also presented clear and convincing
proof of his acceptance of a remainder interest in the Klimt painting by evidence
that he had made several contemporaneous
statements acknowledging the gift to his
friends and associates, even showing some
of them his father's gift letter, and that he
had retained both letters for over 17 years
to verify the gift after his father died.
Defendant relied exclusively on affidavits
filed by plaintiff in a matrimonial action
with his former wife, in which plaintiff
failed to list his interest in the painting as
an asset. These affidavits were made over
10 years after acceptance was complete
and they do not even approach the evidence
in Matter of Kelly (285 N.Y. 139, 148-149,
33 N.E.2d 62 [dissenting in part opn.], supra) where the donee, immediately upon
delivery of a diamond ring, rejected it as
"too flashy". We agree with the Appellate
Division that interpretation of the affidavit
was too speculative to support a finding of
rejection and overcome the substantial
showing of acceptance by plaintiff.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from
and the order of the Appellate Division
brought up for review should be affirmed,
with costs.
WACHTLER, CJ., and MEYER, KAYE,
ALEXANDER, TITONE and HANCOCK,
JJ., concur.
Judgment appealed from and order of
the Appellate Division brought up for review affirmed, with costs.
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In the Matter of FIRST ENERGY
LEASING CORPORATION et
al., Appellants,
v.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL of the State of
New York, Respondent
Court of Appeals of New York.
July 10, 1986.
Attorney General initiated proceeding
pursuant to the Martin Act, naming 59
parties allegedly involved in promoting energy management systems as a fraudulent
tax shelter scheme. Defendants moved to
require Attorney General to conduct their
examination ordered pursuant to the Act
entirely before a justice of the Supreme
Court or referee, and to transcribe the testimony of all witnesses who appeared in
the proceeding and to immediately file the
transcripts in the county clerk's office.
The Supreme Court, New York County,
McQuillan, J., denied the motion, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, 107 A.D.2d 1095, 485
N.Y.S.2d 159, affirmed, and defendants appealed by permission. The Court of Appeals, Hancock, J., held that: (1) Attorney
General was required by express provision
of statute to examine defendants only before a justice of the Supreme Court or
designated referee, and (2) statute did not
require immediate filing of witness transcripts.
Affirmed as modified.
1. Securities Regulation <3=>274
When the Attorney General conducts
an investigation pursuant to the Martin Act
and proceeds specifically under sections
presupposing an official determination to
commence an action under the Act, he is by
express provision of the statute permitted
to examine witnesses only before a justice
of the Supreme Court or designated referee; broad powers accorded Attorney
General under section of the Act authoriz-
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^erefore, w u not a
prerequisite to recovery by the plaintiff up*
on the defendant's undertaking,
Id;
Higinbotham v, Manchester, 113 Conn. 62,
72, 154 A. 242, 79 A.L.R. 85. The defendant's undertaking was not to pay a stated
sum and no more but to pay the amount of
the note plus interest In such a case the
damages recoverable against the guarantor
are the amount due on the obligation. 12
R.CL 1096, § 51. And this includes interest* Shelton v, French, 33 Conn. 489,
496; Cooper v. Page, 24 Me. 73, 77, 41
Ara.Dec. 371; Birken v. Tapper, 45 S.D.
600, 60S, 189 N.W. 698, 24 AJLR. 832;
Bank of South Carolina v, Knotta, 10 Rich.,
S.C. 543, 546, 70 Am.Dec 234; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 651, 24 L,E<L
521; 24 Am.Jur, 925, § 78. See also 28
CJ. 966. The court erred in not allowing
the plaintiff interest to the date of judgment
There is no error on the defendant's ap*
peal There is error on the plaintiff's appeal, the judgment is set aside and the Superior Court is directed to enter judgment
for the plaintiff for $1900 with b u r e t
£rom November 2,1931, to the date of judg-

6, Aekeewtedgmeat *»*2
Deeds *»J»4<4)
Where deed was actually delivered to
grantee, the execution of the &ttestaeto*
clause was prima facie proof that deed waa
delivered, and there waa a rebuttable presumption that grantee assented, sines deed
waa beneficial to him,
4* Acknowledgment *»52
Deeds $»l*4(4)
The presumption of Intention to deliver
deed, arising from execution of attestation
clause, and presumption that grantee assented to delivery, can be overcome only by evi«
dance that no delivery was in fact intended.
5. Otsds «*208<t)
Where grantor deeded property to gran*
tee and recorded deed and grantee then redeeded the same property to tractor by deed
which was not recorded, statement by grantor that purpose of transaction waa to protect bins in event grantee predeceased gran*
tor, conclusively established that there waa
a legal delivery of the unrecorded deed,
since the purpose of the transaction would
have been defeated had there been no de^
Titt ^ T V ' p ^ U U e .

» . « * - * n ^ WUUiUUim UUimiJ 'im
In this opinion, the other judges concurmade by placing the deed is the hands of
red
a third person to be kept by him until the
happening of the event upon the happening
of which the deed Is to he delirered over by
(o\wn*m
the third person to the grantee, and con*
5>
ditiooa) delivery to a grantee vesta absolute
title in the grantee.
See Words sod Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definltiona of
•'Conditional D^iry".
126 Conn. 391
SWEgNEV v, SWEENEY,
-? JWrf* teflL
• wnere gramm w*re<*w V» ~*>" ~« - •*
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
tee and recorded de«d and granite then reMarch 6, 1940.
deeded property directly to grantor by deed
which was not recorded* and grantor pre1. Dssds *»206(3)
deceased grantee, delivery of the unrecorded
The physical powesslon of a duly exe- to the grantor on condition that it was to he
cuted deed is not conclusive proof that it effective only If the grantee predeceased
waa legally delivered, even where there has grantor was not Inoperative as a "condibeen a manual delivery.
tional delivery".

2. Dssds 4»56(2)
"Delirery" of rf deed must be made
with the intent to pass title if It is to be
effective*
Set Wordt and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Denary".

0, Evidence C»3$0(i), 462
Parol evidence is not admissible to •ary
the terms of the deed but may he received
to show the use that was to be msde of it
9. Evldtnoe 694(6
Where grantor deeded property to gr*a«
tee and recorded deed, aao grantee then re-

SWEENEY r< SWEENEY
Conn.
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u
deeded the property to the grantor, by deed done* At the same time he requested that
wnicb was unrecorded, and grantor** widow a deed be prepared from John to himself
brought suit to cancel the recorded deed so that be, Maurice, would be protected if
afUr the grantor's death, permitting town John predeceased him. Both deeds were
clerk to testify to certain statement* made duly executed. The first was left for reby the grantor when the deed was drafted, cording and the second was taken awiy by
WAS proper as showing the circumstances Maurice and never recorded. A week or
surrounding delivery.
two later Maurice took to John the recorded deed and a week or two after that
took the unrecorded deed to John's house.
Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex John kept both deeds and gave the second
deed to his attorney after the institution of
County; Alfred C Baldwin, Judge.
this action. It was destroyed when the
Action by Maria E Sweeney, adminis- latter** office was burned. After the executratrix of the estate of Maurice Sweeney, tion of the deeds, Maurice continued to ocdeceased, against John M. Sweeney to can- cupy the property, paid the fixed charges,
cel a certain deed and for other relief and received the rents and exercised full domintried to the Court Judgment for the de- ion over it until his death. In April, 1937,
fendant, and the plaintiff appeal*.
Maurice matfe a written lease to Ernest
Error and new trial ordered.
Myers of a portion of the premises and on
Argued before MALTBIE, C J., and June 18, 1938, a written lease to Frank and
HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JEN- Esther Fricke for twenty yeaas. The first
lease is lost but the second was recorded
NINGS, JJ.
The defendant never collected any money
William M. Harney, of Hartford, and from tenants or paid any fixed charges or
Joseph V. Fay, Jr„ of New Haven, for ap- repairs prior to the death of Maurice. On
pellant
these facts the atrial court concluded that
James M. Kelly and Thomas C Flood, there was no intention to make present deboth of Middletown, for appellee.
livery of John's deed to Maurice, that
there was no delivery or acceptance thereJENNINGS, Judge.
of, that it was not intended to operate unMaurice Sweeney, plaintiffs Intestate, til John's death and rendered judgment
hereinafter called Maurice, deeded his farm for the defendant
to his brother J6hn M. Sweeney, hereinThis deed was, in effect, manually, deafter called John, and the deed was re- livered. Maurice continued to occupy the
corded * John deeded the property back to property and exercised full dominion over
MauSce, This deed is unrecorded and was it without interference by John. It follows
accidentally burned The question to be that all the essentials of a good delivery
decided is whether the *econ7"lieed was were present unless there is something in
delivered and if to, whether or not a con- the contentions of John which defeats this
dition claimed to be attached to the de- result .He claims that there was no intenlivery is operative. This must be deter* tion on his part to make present delivery.
mined on the finding'. The following state[I, 2] It is, of course, true that physical
ment includes such changes therein as are
possession of a duly executed deed is not
required by the evidence:
conclusive proof that it was legally deThe plaintiff is the widow and adminis- livered McDermott v. McDermott, 97
tratrix of Maurice but had not lived with
Conn. 31, 34, 115 A. 638. This is so under
him for the twenty yean preceding his
some circumstances even where there has
death in September, 1938, at the age of
been a manual delivery. Hotaling v. Hotalseventy-three yean. Maurice lived on a
tract of land of some hundred and thirty- inf. 193 Cal. 368, 381, 224 P. 455, 56 A.LH
five acres which he owned in East Hamp- 734, and note page 746. Delivery must be
ton, where he ran a tavern. John Assisted made with the intent to pass title if it is
him in running the tavern to some extent to be effective. Porter v. Woodbouse, 59
On February 2, 1937, Maurice and John Conn. 568, 575, 22 A. 299, 13 L.R.A. 64, 21
went to the town cleric's office in East Am.StRep. 131; McDermott T. McDerHampton pursuant to an appointment made mott, supra.
the preceding day. Maurice requested the
[>$] The deed having been in effect
town clerk to draw a deed of his East actually delivered to Maurice, the execution
Hampton property to John and this was of the attestation clause was prima fade
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proof that the deed was delivered. New
Haven Trust Co. v, Camp, 81 Conn. 539,
542, 71 A. 788. There is a rebuttable pre
sumption that the grantee assented since
the deed was beneficial to him. Moore v.
Giles, 49 Conn. 370, 373. No fact is found
which militates against this presumption.
Where deeds are formally executed and delivered, these presumptions can be overcome only by evidence that no delivery was
in fact intended Loughran v. Kummer,
297 Pa. 179, 183, 146 A. 534; Cragin's Estate, 274 Pa. 1, 5, 117 A. 445; Stewart v.
Silva, 192 Cai. 405, 409, 221 P. 191. The
only purpose in making the deed expressed
by either party was the statement by
Maurice that it was to protect him in case
John predeceased him. Since this purpose
would have been defeated had there been
no delivery with intent to pass title, this
conclusively establishes the fact that there
was a legal delivery,

229, 234, 204 P. 818 (grantor retained possession of the premises And gave a morv
gage of it); Stewart v. Silva, supra, 192
Cai. 410, 221 P. 191; City National Bank
v. Anderson, 189 Ky. 487, 225 S.W. 361
(deed surrendered to grantor); 16 AmJur.
506; 21 C.J. 874. As is pointed out in the
Loughran case, supra, this is one of the instances where a positive rule of law may
defeat the actual intention of the parties.
The safety of real estate titles is considered moTt important than the unfortunate
results which may follow the application
of the rule in a few individual instances.
To relax it would open the door wide to
fraud and the fabrication of evidence. Although the doctrine has been criticised (2
Tiffany, Real Property [2d Ed.) p. 1764; 5
Wigmore, . Evidence [2d Ed.] §§ 2405,
2408) no material change has been noted in
the attitude of the courts in this country.

[8,9] Thefinding-does not support the
[6,7] The defendant next claims that conclusion. The finding shows a delivery
if there was a delivery, it was on condition and, even if a conditional delivery is asand that the condition (the death of John sumed, the condition is not good for the
oefore that of Maurice) was not and can- reasons stated. Since a new trial is nccwnot be fulfilled. This claim is not good J j e - y ~ " i ; 7 ^ n d t?a ^ o V ' e v t e ^
cause the delivery was to the grantee. "A ground
" - of- appeal is noticed.
- - —
The town
conditional delivery is and can only be
clerk was permitted to testify to certain
made by placing the deed in the hands of a
third person to be kept by him until the statements made by Maurice when the deed
happening of the event upon the happening was drafted. Parol evidence is not admisof which the deed is to be delivered over sible to vary the terms of the deed but may
by the third person to the grantee.1' Porter be received to show the use that was to be
v. Woodhousc, supra, 59 Conn. 574, 22 A. made of it Fisk^s Appeal, 81 Conn. 433,
300, 13 L.R.A. 64,21 Am.St.Rep. 131; Ray- 437, 71 A. 559. The ruling was correct as
mond v. Smith, 5 Conn. 555, 559. Condi- showing the circumstances surrounding detional delivery to a .grantee vests absolute livery.
There is error and a new trial is ordered
title in the latter. Loughran v. Kummer,
In this opinion the other judges consupra, 297 Pa, 185, 146 A- 534; McCarthy
v. Security i rust ot savings BankTTW cai. curred.

